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In this dissertation, I examine whether members of radical environmental and animal 
rights groups are deterred by legal sanctions, morality, both, or neither.  From a 
rational choice framework, I hypothesize that members of these groups weigh costs 
and benefits and act based on expected utility.  I measure an increase in costs through 
three federal sentencing acts targeted at reducing the criminal behavior of these 
groups and hypothesize that this legislation decreased the total, serious, and 
ideologically-specific activity of extremists.  I also contend that two terrorist events, 
the nearly fatal tree-spiking of George Alexander and the assassination of Hyram 
Kitchen, also increased the costs of criminal conduct for members of radical eco-
groups.  I evaluate interviews with twenty-five activists and analyze a database of 
1056 incidents through both time-series and series hazard modeling.  The interviews 
yield support for the rational choice perspective, particularly in regards to micro-level 
  
considerations of legal sanctions and morality.  My quantitative findings indicate that 
the legislation was influential, albeit varying in direction by the method employed.  
Specifically, the time-series models yield significant increases in the frequency of 
criminal conduct after the legislation, while the series hazard analyses demonstrate a 
decrease in the hazard of an attack.  I also find that the two major terrorist events did 
not significantly impact the criminal conduct of these groups.  I conclude that 
members of radical environmental and animal rights groups are rational actors whom 
consider the moral evaluation of a given act and are susceptible to an increase in costs 
as measured through legislative efforts, but not as operationalized as a response to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One of today’s most serious domestic terrorism threats come from special 
interest extremist movements such as the Animal Liberation Front, the Earth 
Liberation Front, and the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty campaign (John 
Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI, 2005, Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works). 
 
Radical environmental and animal rights groups have been deemed a 
significant terrorist threat by both the law enforcement and scholarly communities 
alike.  In his 2002 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest 
Health, James F. Jarboe, the Domestic Terrorism Section Chief of the FBI, 
maintained that, “ALF/ELF (Animal Liberation Front/Environmental Liberation 
Front) have committed more than 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, 
resulting in damages in excess of 43 million dollars.”  In 2006, Donald Liddick, the 
author of Ecoterrorism, argued that, “the growth and severity of so-called eco-terror 
and animal rights criminality from the 1970s to the present day is noticeable and 
significant” (p.1).  A recent survey conducted by Simone and colleagues (2008) found 
that 60% of state police agencies reported that these groups represented a substantial 
hazard to the safety of their citizens.   
Perceptions of these groups as a top domestic terrorist threat have prompted 
the U.S. government to respond through legislation, which has increased the 
punishments for various eco-related offenses.  These types of countermeasures are 
based on ideas as old as punishment itself; the premise that severe sanctions should 
decrease criminal conduct by increasing the costs as weighed in rational decision-




to severe sanctions because they hold strong moral convictions based on philosophies 
that many ascribe to; namely, deep ecology and biocentrism.  In other words, an 
activist’s moral evaluation of a criminal act is independent of and conditions the 
impact of legal sanctions.  Recent theoretical development suggests that 
environmental context affects these moral evaluations (Bouhana and Wikstrom, 
2008); with other research indicating that high profile attacks can change such an 
environment toward the immoral side of the continuum (Wheatley and McCauley, 
2008; Dugan et al., 2008).  This multiplicative explanation for motivation prompts the 
question, Are members of radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred 
by legal sanctions, morality, both, or neither?  Both of these explanations for 
deterrence remain untested among this population, along with the larger question of 
whether members of these groups have been deterred at all.    
The ‘Threat’ of Radical Environment and Animal Rights Groups  
The illegal activities of radical environmental and animal rights groups have 
received a considerable amount of attention from federal law enforcement and 
Congress since September 11th and the subsequent “war on terror.”  In 2006, FBI 
Director Robert S. Mueller stated that, “Terrorism is terrorism-no matter the motive.  
The FBI is committed to protecting Americans from all crime and all terrorism, 
including acts of domestic terrorism on behalf of animal rights or the environment.”  
Director Mueller most recently noted that, “Animal rights extremism and eco-
terrorism continue to pose a threat.  There’s a clear difference between 
constitutionally protected advocacy-which is the right of all Americans-and violent 




2009 addition of Daniel Andreas, an animal rights activist suspected of two nonlethal 
bombings, to the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorists List” demonstrates a clear focus on 
this particular criminal offense (Friden, 2009). 
Although considerably less likely to be alarmists about the matter, most 
scholars concede that members of radical eco-groups pose some sort of hazard.  In 
1996, Eagan felt that this activity had already peaked some ten years earlier but 
cautioned that, “the Clinton administration’s attempts to develop a comprehensive 
timber plan could spark a new wave of violence in the forests of America” (p. 14).  
Ackerman (2003), in a thoughtful qualitative risk assessment of ELF, argued that, 
“based on its current activities, it seems something of a mischaracterization to label 
(it) as one of the most serious domestic threats in the United States.  However, adding 
dynamics to the assessment signals that the threat of large-scale (and even CBRN) 
attacks by the ELF is growing and this may eventually rise to the point where the ELF 
poses a high level threat” (p. 162).  Even Taylor (2003), who disagrees with 
Ackerman’s (2003) conclusions, contends that, “raising such questions…does not 
mean that there is not potential for violence in these groups” (p. 179).   
Empirical and Theoretical Attention 
Overall, there is a lack of empirical research on the aforementioned claims 
regarding the criminal activities of environmental and animal rights extremists.  Two 
exceptions are a 1993 report to Congress conducted jointly by the Department of 
Justice and Department of Agriculture on the activities of groups that target animal 
enterprises and a 2008 report authored by the Department of Homeland Security.  




and are unclear about their sources of information.  Another exception is the recent 
empirical contribution by Smith and colleagues (2009), which established how 
quickly planned and how close targets were to offenders’ primary residences.  
However, other than documenting the 111 events that members of radical eco-groups 
were responsible for based on federal sentencing data, Smith et al.’s (2009) analysis 
is outside the scope of this investigation due to its primary focus on pre-incident 
behaviors.   
There also seems to be very little in the way of theoretical conceptualization 
focused on explaining the motivations of environmental and animal rights extremists.  
Liddick’s (2006) book argues for the role of the techniques of neutralization in 
relation to the survey responses of activists.  In addition, Smith and colleagues’ 
(2009) recent contribution highlights the routine activities of members of radical eco-
groups in pre-incident behaviors.  While both of these works are important in their 
own right, they do not explicitly include what is likely one of the most relevant of 
criminological theories in explaining the actions of environmental and animal rights 
extremists: the rational choice perspective, and specifically, deterrence theory. 
A Theory that Fits 
The rational choice perspective and its theoretical kin deterrence theory enjoy 
a rich history with origins in the classical school of thought.  Prior to the 1600s, crime 
was considered to be a sin; accordingly, punishment was aimed at the crime and the 
sin.  Hobbes, one of the first philosophers to comprehensively develop the concept of 
the rational actor, argued for the importance of the social contract; a tacit agreement 




peaceful society.  In the 1700s, great thinkers like Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy 
Bentham viewed action through the utilitarian principle; that is, man behaves in order 
to maximize pleasure and minimize pain and that action should be based on the 
greater good.  These philosophers also set the stage for the view that offenders utilize 
a cost-benefit analysis, with crime occurring when the potential rewards outweigh the 
consequences.   
This concept, the cost-benefit analysis of offender decision-making, has 
become the crux of the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  
Originally based in economics, this perspective argues that people have preferences 
for outcomes formed from their socialization and/or past experiences.  People then act 
on both their orientation toward the future and on the basis of what they think will 
happen.  Rational choice theorists also contend that individual decision-making is 
based on “expected utility;” in other words, a crime will be committed if an 
offender’s perceptions dictate that the benefits of that particular crime outweigh its 
costs.  These decisions are also based on the offense being considered.  In other 
words, a person’s rational choice is crime-specific. 
Deterrence theory centers on the idea that an increase in costs, measured 
through punishment, will influence criminal behavior.  Deterrence originally focused 
on objective measures of the certainty, severity, and celerity of legal sanctions 
(Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Tittle and Rowe, 1974).  For 
example, Tittle (1969) examined the relationship between state-level index crime 
rates and both certain (incarcerations versus reports to the police) and severe 




death) legal sanctions, only to discover support for the former.  Tittle (1969) 
concluded that certain punishments deter crime regardless of the level of severity, but 
that a state’s “normative climate” may also be a factor.  In other words, states with 
certain punishments and low crime rates may be a reflection of an overall intolerance 
for crime rather than a deterrent effect of such punishments.  Latter objective 
deterrence research has examined certain punishments through policing strategies like 
mandatory arrest for domestic assault (Sherman and Berk, 1984) and crackdowns 
(Sherman et al., 1995) yielding mixed results.  Other studies have focused on severe 
punishments such as three strikes laws (Kovandzic et al., 2004) and the death penalty 
(Cochran and Chamlin, 2000).  All in all, objective deterrence research shows some 
support for the effectiveness of certain punishments on aggregate crime rates, but 
very little for those punishments that are considered to be severe (Pratt et al., 2006).    
In order to tackle causal issues like those addressed by Tittle (1969), 
researchers began to take into account a person’s perceptions of a given punishment 
(Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen et al., 1978).  For example, 
Jensen and colleagues (1978) discovered a relationship between the perceived risk of 
punishment and self-reported delinquency in a sample of high school students.  
Overall, deterrence studies similar to this one have discovered the most support for 
the perceived certainty of punishment (Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen et al. 1978), but 
little for either perceived severity (Pratt et al., 2006) or perceived celerity (Nagin and 
Pogarsky, 2001).  Certainty effect sizes also seem to vary by the type of crime 




Additional work on perceptional deterrence has suggested that individual 
differences may explain why some people are deterred and others are not (Grasmick 
and Bursik, 1990; Bachman et al., 1992; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996; Pogarsky, 2002; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003).  This research has 
established two primary themes regarding individual differences on perceptions of 
punishment.  First, a person’s consideration of the certainty and/or severity of a 
punishment is affected by one’s level of self-control; often measured through present-
orientation and self-centeredness (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Pogarsky, 2002; 
Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003).  That is, those with low levels of self-control are more 
likely to value immediate rewards (as opposed to long-term costs) as they place little 
importance on their future (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993).  Second, an individual is 
deterred by their level of internalized morality rather than by their perception of a 
formal sanction (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Bachman et al., 1992; Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996).  As Bachman and colleagues (1992) note, “persons may refrain from 
offending not only because they fear the consequences of their action, but because 
they believe the act to be morally wrong” (p. 346).  Therefore, the level of morality a 
person carries with them also affects their individual cost-benefit analysis of a 
particular act (Bachman et al., 1992).  For example, a highly moral person may not 
only consider state sanctions when contemplating a certain behavior if they believe 
the behavior in question to be morally wrong.     
Research Question #1: The Applicability of the Rational Choice Perspective 
Considering that terrorism is a deliberate crime involving some level of 




rational actors (Smith et al., 2009), it is not surprising that the rational choice 
perspective has been successfully applied to this crime (Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree et 
al. 2009).  Given the philosophical underpinnings behind the environmental and 
animal rights movement, where all life is valued equally and pacifism is embraced, 
the concept of individual morality (or moral inhibitions) seems especially applicable.  
Therefore, perhaps it is not solely formal sanctions, but also a high level of individual 
morality that deters environmental and animal rights activists from committing 
criminal and terrorist acts.    
Thus, it is imperative to first and foremost ascertain whether those specific to 
an environmental or animal rights ideology operate from within a rational choice 
framework; decision-making that is marked by weighing costs and benefits and acting 
based on expected utility.  In other words, are those who are motivated by an 
environmental and/or animal rights ideology sensitive to considerations of legal 
sanctions and moral evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses?  To answer this 
question, I evaluate the responses of twenty-five environmental and animal rights 
activists from semi-structured interviews.  More specifically, I determine how 
important legal sanctions are in their individual decision-making.  Furthermore, I 
examine my interview data for themes consistent with the concept of moral 
inhibitions.  In the end, the interviews supported my first hypothesis; namely, the 
rational choice perspective can be applied to environmental and animal rights 
activists in that my sample weighed costs in the form of legal sanctions and was 





Research Question #2: Legal Sanctions 
Recent efforts in the field of criminology have been aimed at evaluating 
certain and severe countermeasures like that of metal detectors on the prevalence of 
aerial hijackings (Dugan et al., 2005), military interventions and their influence on 
terrorism in Northern Ireland (LaFree et al., 2009), and state laws and their effect on 
abortion clinic victimization (Pridemore and Freilich, 2007).  All in all, 
countermeasure investigations have garnered little support for deterrence theory, 
although as Lum et al. (2006) caution, this may be due to the relative lack of 
empirical research focused on evaluating such measures.  In fact, I could identify no 
published literature testing the effectiveness of countermeasures aimed at combating 
the criminal conduct of members of radical eco-groups.  Therefore, my second task 
(after determining the appropriateness of applying a rational choice framework to 
members of these groups) is to measure the impact of such countermeasures.  In other 
words, from a rational choice perspective, I examine an increase in costs measured 
through punishment severity1 in relation to its potential effects on illegal behavior.  
Thus, my second research is: How effective has recent U.S. federal legislation been in 
decreasing the criminal activities of members of radical environmental and animal 
rights groups?   
In this research, I concentrate on three important federal sentencing acts.  The 
first is the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADA).  Although initially unrelated to 
radical eco-groups, this legislation was amended to include a clause criminalizing the 
use of a “hazardous or injurious device on federal land” in response to a high profile 
                                                
1 Due to the general length of prosecution involving federal criminals and the overall lack of 
prosecutions tried under the legislation of interest, neither the celerity nor certainty of these laws can 




incident where a logger was severely injured by a tree-spike (Smith, 2008).  The 
second is the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (AEPA), which “increases 
penalties on a person who ‘intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning 
of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any 
property (including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby 
causes economic damage exceeding $25,000 to that enterprise, or conspires to’” 
(Walker, 2007: 104).  Finally, I study the effects of the recent adoption of the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (AETA) into law and its enhanced penalties for 
“acts disruptive of an ‘animal enterprise’ and leading to a ‘reasonable fear’ on the part 
of that enterpriser’s owner for their property, including boycotts or other forms of 
previously lawful protest leading to ‘losses or increased costs’ exceeding $10,000” 
(Vanderheiden, 2008: 306).   
I assess this research question through the construction and analysis of an 
incident-level database on the criminal and terrorist activities of members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups.  This database is, to my knowledge, the most 
comprehensive collection, to date, of the illegal conduct of environmental and animal 
rights extremists in the United States.  The Eco-Incidents Database (EID) was 
initially assembled through events in the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and 
Dugan, 2007), or the GTD.  The GTD contains a range of variables covering both 
domestic and international terrorist incidents from 1970 through 2007.  These data 
were then supplemented through several open source chronologies, allowing for the 
ability to analyze both criminal and terrorist acts committed by members of radical 




non-terrorist crimes, I most heavily relied on the extensive chronology collected by 
the Foundation for Biomedical Research, although several other open source 
chronologies were independently examined to ensure a comprehensive set of cases.  
In all, I collected a total of 1056 unique U.S. incidents committed by members of 
radical eco-groups from the years 1970 through 2007.   
The EID also offers a variety of important variables intrinsic to evaluating the 
criminal conduct of these groups; namely, for every incident there is information on 
the time and place, whether the incident was successful, target, attack type, 
perpetrator, weapon use, damage caused (both physical injury and property 
destruction), and whether an incident was terrorism.  I evaluate all three sentencing 
acts in regards to trends in total incidents and serious (terrorist and involving damage) 
incidents perpetrated by environmental and animal rights extremists.  I also 
disaggregate the events by ideology to see if the laws had differing influences on the 
specific behaviors they were initially intended to legislate.  In other words, and 
despite the possibility of spillover, ADA was specifically written for environmental 
crimes, while AEPA and AETA are more focused on animal motivated activity.  This 
will also allow me to examine the possibility of substitution effects.   
I analyze my second research question through both interrupted time-series 
and series hazard analyses.  Applying two strategies to evaluate these relationships 
increases the reliability of the results and allows me to explore two separate ways to 
measure the five outcomes of interest.  All in all, I find that the three pieces of 
legislation produced a significant decrease in the hazard, but an increase in the 




While acknowledging that the two strategies are measuring separate outcomes, given 
the issues intrinsic to time-series analysis, I put more stock in the conclusion that the 
legislation decreased activity as hypothesized given the estimates from series hazard 
models are based on a more refined measure of variability. 
Research Question #3: High Profile Terrorist Events 
Discussions of the moral context have come to the forefront of analyses 
regarding terrorist decision-making with Bouhana and Wikstrom’s (2008) recent 
application of “situational action” theory.  These authors argue that a person’s 
individual morality (values and emotions) and the moral context (rules and 
enforcement) of the situation influence the chances that they will engage in terrorist 
acts.  In this perspective, “law-breaking occurs when there is a lack of 
correspondence between the law and the individual's moral values in a given context” 
(Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008:6).  Bouhana and Wikstrom (2008) maintain that 
crimes as diverse as suicide terrorism and shoplifting are similar in that they are all 
governed by individual and contextual moral elements, contingent on a person’s 
moral education.   
Recently, Wheatley and McCauley (2008) demonstrated the importance of 
moral context through a case study of the Luxor massacre, a seemingly “successful” 
terrorist attack perpetrated by the Islamic Group in Egypt in 1997.  This attack was 
especially brutal and viewed as such by Egyptian citizens and members of the Islamic 
Group alike, leading to an overall disillusionment with Islamic extremism and greater 




morality in the decrease in Egyptian terrorism following Luxor arguing that, “a 
terrorist act seen as immoral has the potential to make all terrorists immoral” (p.24).   
Although silent on the role of morality in the desistance of the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of 
the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), Dugan and colleagues (2008) provide a similar 
argument.  The authors found that the “immoral” targeting of non-Turkish citizens, 
highlighted by an especially brutal attack on the Orly airport in Paris, lead to a 
decrease in ASALA’s support base.  Interestingly, this attack also influenced support 
for terrorism as a whole measured through JCAG’s decline, a group with competing 
interests to that of ASALA.  The researchers contend that, “the most important 
audience of terrorist activity is therefore not the enemy, but the terrorists’ own 
sympathizers and supporters” (p. 246).   
This research suggests that moral context of the situation is also important to 
take into consideration.  In other words, it is probable that U.S. terrorist incidents 
have affected the moral landscape in a similar way as the Luxor massacre and the 
Orly airport incident.  In fact, Eidelson and McCauley (2009) discovered a decline in 
public support for right-wing ideologies after the Oklahoma City bombing.  In an 
analysis of the American National Election Survey, the researchers discovered that a 
scale composed of item responses that indicated that the “government is out of 
control” and that “minorities are a threat” peaked right before the bombing and then 
substantially decreased.  The authors conclude that this finding, “is consistent with 
the view that extremist violence produces a decline in public sympathy for the 




The two terrorist attacks most likely to have affected the environmental and 
animal rights movement in a similar way are the Alexander tree-spiking and the 
Kitchen assassination.  The former event involved the severe injury of a logger, 
George Alexander, which led to a public outcry (both within and outside the 
environmental movement) against the use of tree-spiking as a tactic.  The latter 
incident refers to the killing of the Dean of the University of Tennessee veterinary 
school; a killing that was preceded by several threats made by animal rights 
extremists.  Both of these attacks were widely publicized and represent the events 
most likely to foster an environment where the use of terrorist tactics is seen as 
immoral.   
Therefore, it is possible that the environments after these events were ones 
where the perceived costs of being associated with terrorism had increased due to a 
change in the climate.  Thus, my third research question is: Are members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups deterred by an increase in costs as measured 
through high profile terrorist attacks?  I explore this question once again through 
interrupted time-series and series hazard modeling of the EID in relation to the 
Alexander tree-spiking (date of May 8, 1987) and Kitchen assassination (date of 
February 8, 1990).  I conclude that, overall, my hypotheses are unsupported in that 
neither of these events significantly influence the total, serious (terrorist or involving 
damage), or ideologically-specific conduct perpetrated by members of radical 





In this dissertation, I set out to evaluate the applicability of the rational choice 
framework; particularly one that focuses on an increase in costs, to the criminal 
conduct committed by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups.  I 
achieve this task through (1) an exploration of whether environmental and animal 
rights activists consider legal sanctions and the moral evaluation of a given act, (2) an 
analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. federal sentencing acts aimed at addressing 
criminal conduct and, (3) an evaluation of what role high profile events play in this 
conduct.  My analyses include qualitative interviews with those that ascribe to an 
environmental and/or animal rights ideology, along with both interrupted time-series 
and series hazard modeling of the Eco-Incidents Database in relation to three federal 
sentencing acts and two U.S. terrorist events. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I (1) 
clarify the terms eco-terrorism and ecotage and explain why I instead use more 
neutral terms, (2) discuss the philosophical background of those that adhere to 
environmental and animal rights principles, (3) describe the most influential of the 
ecological and animal rights groups in the United States, namely the Environmental 
Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front, and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, 
with a focus on their structure and important leaders and, (4) examine the targets and 
tactics that these groups have focused on in the past.  Also in Chapter 2, I discuss 
rational choice, deterrence, and micro and macro-level research on morality in 
reference to its applicability in explaining crime, terrorism, and both behaviors 
perpetuated by members of radical eco-groups.  In Chapter 3, I describe the data 




operationalization of important variables involved in the analyses.  I also review the 
research questions and related hypotheses and analyses.  In Chapter 4, I describe the 
results for my first research question: Are those who are motivated by an 
environmental and/or animal rights ideology sensitive to considerations of legal 
sanctions and moral evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses?   In Chapter 5, I 
provide the results for the second research question: How effective has recent U.S. 
federal legislation been in decreasing the criminal activities of radical environmental 
and animal rights groups?  In Chapter 6, I review the results from the third research 
question: Are members of radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred 
by an increase in costs as measured through high profile terrorist attacks?   Finally, 
in Chapter 7, I summarize my conclusions, comment on study implications and 






Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Conceptualization 
Eco-terrorism and Ecotage: Misnomers 
Although eco-terrorism has become part of the American lexicon, the 
appropriateness of this term has often been criticized.  As defined by the FBI, eco-
terrorism is, “the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against 
innocent victims or property by an environmentally orientated sub national group for 
environmental-political reasons, aimed at an audience beyond the target, and often of 
a symbolic nature” (U.S. Congress.  House.  Subcommittee on Forests and Forest 
Health).  However, scholars often criticize this language as both socially constructed 
and inappropriate due to the contention that environmental and animal rights 
extremists rarely target humans or utilize forceful means (Vanderheiden, 2005; 2008; 
Amster, 2006).  These proposed distinctions would also separate many of the 
incidents perpetrated by members of radical eco-groups from the more general 
definition of terrorism as proposed by LaFree and Ackerman (2009) as, “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force, directed against civilian targets, by non state 
actors, in order to obtain a political goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (p. 1).     
Liddick (2006) argues that because the majority of incidents are minor 
property damage, “the application of the term terrorism does not seem to be 
warranted” (p.7).  Liddick maintains that the real issue is intention: members of 
radical eco-groups are selective about their targets and those targets do not usually 




“target people indiscriminately2” (p.8).  In tackling this definitional issue in his 2005 
article, Vanderheiden, who prefers the term ecotage (economic sabotage of inanimate 
objects thought to be complicit in environmental destruction) contends that the, 
“destruction of property that merely threatens the further destruction of property, 
where no people need to fear for their personal safety and no cultural artifact of major 
significance to people is threatened with obliteration, must be regarded as a 
categorically distinct act.  Conflating it with genuine terrorism unfairly associates 
those who observe a crucial moral distinction with those who do not3” (p. 432).  The 
author cites the evolution of tree-spiking as support; after causing injury to several 
loggers, one group banned the practice altogether while another urged that spikes be 
placed high enough that they would not cause additional damage.  Although 
Vanderheiden (2005) cautions against the word terrorism he does not feel that ecotage 
can be construed as a form of civil disobedience: “several dissimilarities between 
nonviolent civil disobedience and ecotage suggest that the two tactics may be too 
disanalogous to rest upon the same moral foundations” (p. 437).  Nevertheless, 
Vanderheiden (2005) contends that ecotage may be considered “political resistance” 
if the following conditions are met: 
(1) some act is being undertaken which is contrary to both law and justice; (2) 
state officials charged with enforcing relevant laws are unwilling or unable 
to do so; (3) serious damage is imminent and, once complete, will be 
durable and irreversible; (4) legal means were attempted and proved 
unsuccessful; (5) appeals to the sense of justice of the community have 
either already failed or would be frustrated by the unresponsive policy 
making or enforcement processes (p.443).  
 
                                                
2 In fact, preliminary analysis of the Eco Incident Database uncovers a minority of incidents that target 
people (19%). 
3 However, most U.S. terrorist incidents do not involve a fatality.  In fact, only 9% of the U.S. 




Welchman (2001) has also commented on the association between ecotage 
and civil disobedience.  In contrast to Vanderheiden (2005), Welchman contends that 
ecotage should be considered a form of civil disobedience.  The issue, Welchman 
argues, is the varying definitions of what constitutes such disobedience.  As the 
author states, “according to current definitions of civil disobedience, drawn from the 
work of John Rawls and Carl Cohen, eco-saboteurs are not civil disobedients because 
their disobedience is not a form of address and/or does not appeal to the public’s 
sense of justice or human welfare” (Welchman, 2001: 97).  Welchman maintains that 
an earlier definition of civil disobedience, which was offered by Hugo Bedau in 1961, 
is more appropriate.  This definition, “an illegal act intended directly or indirectly to 
frustrate laws or legally tolerated practices, within the bounds of civility” (Welchman, 
2001:105), is one where acts of ecotage could also be considered as acts of civil 
disobedience.  However, similar to the aforementioned works by Liddick (2006) and 
Vanderheiden (2005), Welchman (2001) makes a distinction between acts that target 
people and those that target property: 
I suggest, then we must recognize that violence, threats of violence, covert 
acts of sabotage, blackmail, and even assault are all means by which laws and 
legal practices might be obstructed.  Such acts are not obviously incompatible 
with maintaining sociability.  Direct assaults upon personal security pose 
perhaps the greatest sociability, so we might argue that both violence and 
threats against persons should be excluded altogether.  But violence against 
property, whether public or covert, is another matter (p. 105).  
 
Amster (2006) has also added to the debate surrounding the rhetoric of the 
term eco-terrorism.  In fact, Amster (2006) takes considerable issue with this wording 
and views it as part of a broader political movement: “The implications of all this 




threat’ in legislative, intelligence-gathering, and law-enforcement circles, seems 
clear: it constitutes a campaign to link environmentalism to terrorism.  More broadly, 
it threatens to criminalize dissent altogether” (p. 293).  In fact, Amster demonstrates 
that if terrorism includes the destruction of property, then our founding fathers would 
fall under this rubric.  Amster argues that eco-terrorism may more aptly be applied to 
those that terrorize the environment; that is, the very targets of these groups.  All in 
all, Amster (2006) maintains, “the general effect of branding someone a terrorist in 
these times is essentially to forestall any such meaningful discussion, to the detriment 
to all concerned” (p. 297). 
In 2008, Vanderheiden revisited these definitional issues with a similar take 
on the distinction between activism and terrorism as Amster (2006).  Specifically, 
Vanderheiden (2008) contends that to consider acts committed by environmental and 
animal rights groups as terrorism is, “to ignore the crucial difference in moral status 
between persons and inanimate objects, and no defensible account of the wrongness 
of terrorism could fail to treat these as categorically different acts.” (p. 314).  In 
addition, Vanderheiden (2008) feels that the use of certain terminology has not been 
the result of causal verbiage, but rather a well thought out tactic: “Coined and 
championed by anti-environmental activists with a keen sense for the propagandistic 
power of language and fervently received by legislators sympathetic to their 
deregulatory agenda, the term invites an association between terrorism and radical 
environmentalism, planting out the spectre of another group of fanatics and mass 
murders out to destroy ‘our’ way of life in the public mind” (p. 299).  The author goes 




Oxford dictionary in 1997) and could not even be considered to be terrorism by the 
FBI until the expansion of their own definition to acts against inanimate objects as 
documented in the 2001 PATRIOT act.   
Not all scholars feel that the labeling of members of radical environmental and 
animal rights groups as terrorists is problematic.  Perlstein (2003) describes a group 
of faculty members at Portland State University who sent letters in support of such 
groups.  The author maintains that this encouragement by academics who identify 
with group members, “supports and reinforces the violent actions of the activists and 
is reminiscent of the cheering heard in certain parts of the Middle East after 9/11” (p. 
171).  Perlstein (2003) goes on to state that not considering an environmental and 
animal rights extremist as terrorists makes them seem as, “pranksters who are striving 
to keep the Earth ‘safe and healthy’” (p. 171). 
This is likely not a debate that will be resolved anytime soon and one that 
further convolutes the study of members of these groups.  However, in keeping with 
the majority of scholars, I have and will continue to avoid the use of the term eco-
terrorism in this dissertation.  Nevertheless, the scholarly alternative of ecotage as 
offered by Vanderheiden (20005) can also be considered as insufficient in that it does 
not represent all of the behavior perpetrated by these groups.  In other words, while 
there may be debate surrounding the applicability of the word terrorism to incidents 
involving these groups because of rare participation in events that fit the definition, 
there is little evidence to suggest that these events never occur.   
Therefore, both eco-terrorism and ecotage are imperfect terms.  Instead, as 




status as a grass roots organization without any clear chain of command or any 
pay/benefits involved, and time and funds directed toward direct action rather than 
aimed at lobbying), this behavior is best referred to as the “illegal activities” or the 
“criminal conduct” of members of radical environmental and animal rights groups, 
environmental and animal rights extremists, or members of radical eco-groups.  In 
addition to being less politically charged, the aforementioned terminology references 
the full spectrum of criminal behaviors, both terrorist and otherwise, committed by 
these groups.  In the next section, I illustrate the different environmental philosophies 
that govern the lives of those that do and do not commit such illegal acts.  As I will 
demonstrate, the philosophy most adhered to by activists that of deep ecology and 
biocentrism, has clear implications for the conceptualization of moral inhibitions.   
Philosophical Underpinnings 
Many ecological and animal rights activists adhere to the ideas of Arne Naess, 
a Norwegian philosopher, who coined his environmental perspective as “deep 
ecology” (Liddick, 2006; Eagan, 1996).  The primary tenet of this philosophy is 
“biocentrism,” or the belief that everything in nature is of equal value.  Consequently, 
biocentrism promotes the protection of not just the living, but also inanimate objects 
like rocks and rivers.  Most troubling about deep ecology is what Eagan (1996) refers 
to as “restoration ecology… (or) an actual rollback of civilization and the ‘recreation’ 
of the wilderness” (p. 3).  Leader and Probst (2003) describe the intention as, “a 
restoration to an imagined pristine state, of an environment believe(d) to have been 
despoiled by the selfish actions of the human race.  In practice, this would mean (a) 




can also be somewhat disconcerting considering its implications.  As Liddick (2006) 
states, “environmental extremists are invariably shaped by some blend of anarchistic, 
apocalyptic, millenarian thinking, striving to hasten the downfall of modern 
civilization so as to realize a better world where man will live in harmony with the 
natural world” (p.3).  Thus, the threat in such a philosophy is that a “world where 
man will live in harmony with the natural world” (Liddick, 2006:3) could also be 
construed as a world with fewer people.   
Nevertheless, there is a divide between those groups who promote violent 
action (i.e. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty) and those that do not (i.e. Greenpeace).  
Furthermore, this divide is independent of a group’s or individual’s acceptance of 
deep ecology.  In other words, many believe in the canons of deep ecology but very 
few interpret it in such a violent fashion.  Rather, it is the philosophy of “green 
anarchy,” a way of thinking that is more consistent with what Liddick (2006) 
describes, that seems to more readily advocate violent tactics.  Green anarchy is, “a 
brand of anarchism that opposes modernization and its effect on the natural 
environment.  Some call themselves primitivists, or green anarchists, and contend that 
humans were better off thousands of years ago, before the advent of farming” 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  Linked to the 
green anarchy philosophy is an anti-capitalism sentiment, along with the 
encouragement of harsher strategies.  The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) cites a 
letter published in Green Anarchy, which reads, “when someone picks up a bomb 
instead of a pen, is when my spirits really soar” 




(2003) describes, “the anarchist influence has the capacity to covert those initially 
concerned primarily for the environment into social revolutionaries acting outside the 
legal system.  It also broadens the range of targets and grievances, and makes any 
accommodation with authorities far more difficult” (p. 147). 
Taylor (2003), however, cautions that green anarchy should be considered a 
distinct ideology to what groups like ALF and ELF ascribe to: “The Earth Liberation 
Front resists environmental despoilers, the Animal Liberation Front confronts those 
who they believe abuse sentient creatures, and anarchists battle industrial civilization, 
both its rulers, infrastructure and symbols” (p. 176).  Although there is much overlap, 
Taylor (2003) argues that these characteristics demonstrate clear intellectual 
boundaries.  In response, Ackerman (2003) has contended that, “the fact remains that 
there are several indicators of relational bridges between these movements across 
which fragments of ideology, tactics, and occasionally cooperation can flow…so 
while these groups may not constitute a single entity, they are at the very least close 
cousins” (p. 188). 
Although there is much debate surrounding the possible distinctions between 
the aforementioned philosophies, there is considerably less concerning which radical 
eco-groups have been the most influential, and perhaps destructive, in the United 
States.  In the next section I seek to describe the formation of these groups, 
specifically, the Environmental Liberation Front, the Animal Liberation Front, and 





Environmental and Animal Rights Extremist Groups 
As previously noted, Eagan (1996) argues that there are three main elements 
that all environmental and animal rights groups share: an uncompromising position, 
status as a grass roots organization without any clear chain of command or any 
pay/benefits involved, and time and funds directed toward direct action rather than 
aimed at lobbying.  Perhaps two of the most well known radical eco-groups are that 
of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF).  
Both were started in the United Kingdom, with the former established in 1976 and the 
latter a splinter of the radical group Earth First! nearly twenty years later (Liddick, 
2006).  
ALF’s primary objective is, “to effectively allocate resources (time and 
money) to end the ‘property status of nonhuman animals.  To abolish institutionalized 
animal exploitation because it assumes that animals are property” 
(http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/mission_statement.htm, accessed 
October 16, 2007).  This group is influenced by a number of philosophers, most 
notably Peter Singer and his work advocating for the equality of animals 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  ALF encourages 
direct action in order to accomplish this mission, primarily through the rescue of 
animals and/or property damage to what they call “animal exploiters.”  Thus, from a 
rational choice perspective, benefits to these groups are anything that would assist 
animals.  According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the earliest incident 
attributed to ALF within the United States was a break-in at the New York University 




ELF has very similar ideals to that of ALF, also promoting the destruction of 
the assets of those, in their minds, who threaten the environment (Liddick, 2006).  
ELF seeks to bring publicity to acts of environmental destruction through their 
various tactics; an important benefit intrinsic to their rational decision-making.  
Perhaps most influential to the development of ELF was Edward Abbey’s book, 
Monkeywrenching, which has become a guidebook of sorts to environmental and 
animal rights extremists through its description of four individuals who cause damage 
to a number of targets in the Southwest (Eagan, 1996).  In fact, Dave Foreman, the 
founder of the Earth First!, was highly affected by Abbey’s book; perhaps best 
demonstrated through Abbey’s foreword in Foreman’s own narrative, Ecodefense: A 
Field Guide to Monkeywrenching.  The difference between the originator group, 
Earth First!!, and its splinter ELF, is more of a focus on direct action.  There are also 
distinctions between ELF and ALF, as previously noted regarding ideology (Taylor, 
2003).  As Ackerman (2003) summarizes, “while animal liberationists decry the 
treatment of individual animals and restrict their concern to sentient beings, radical 
environmentalists display a more global, macro-level approach and are concerned 
with entire species and whole ecosystems” (p. 164). 
The most recent addition to the environmental and animal rights extremist 
scene is the group, Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, or SHAC 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  SHAC was 
created in 1998 in the United Kingdom after a documentary aired on Huntingdon Life 
Sciences (HLS), a research organization, demonstrating the mistreatment of animals 




SHAC became active in the United States through a series of incidents.  SHAC has 
also been known to target businesses or organizations that support HLS; perhaps most 
notorious was the campaign of harassment directed at Stephens Inc., the main 
financial backer of Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS).  After a series of protests 
including a website entitled “StephensKills,” the financial organization sold its shares 
of HLS.  This was perceived to be a major victory for SHAC and perhaps affected 
subsequent cost-benefit analyses for both this group and others.  SHAC was also 
responsible for two significant attacks involving the bombing of HLS supporters in 
California.  As Ackerman (2003) notes, “SHAC continues to use extremely 
aggressive tactics including death threats, firebombings, and violent assaults against 
people connected to Huntingdon Life Sciences” (p. 156). 
The aforementioned groups are prime examples of organizations that lack a 
true hierarchical structure; there is often no one central leader and the groups are 
predominantly composed of individuals or clusters of individuals who work 
separately4.  As Leader and Probst (2003) describe, “the basic principle of leaderless 
resistance is that there is no centralized authority or chain-of-command.  The various 
cells are linked by a shared ideology but otherwise are autonomous, for the most part 
unconnected and unknown to each other” (p. 39).  This lone wolf style does allow for 
the members of these groups to maintain a certain amount of anonymity and thus, 
avoid detection; Ackerman (2003) points to the handful of arrests and convictions.  
And as the ADL describes: “Influenced to varying degrees by their English 
                                                
4 The exception is the “Family,” an organized group of ALF and ELF members responsible for the 
largest federal case involving these groups.  As Smith and colleagues (2009) note, “adopting a more 
‘cellular model’ in lieu of the more prominent ‘uncoordinated violence’ advocated by environmental 
extremist leaders, the Family engaged in training classes to learn sabotage techniques, encryption 




predecessors and by segments of the anarchist movement, (perpetrators) operate 
through autonomous cells, are unconstrained by geographic boundaries and very 
difficult to infiltrate and stop…for example, an activist can become a member of the 
movement simply by carrying out an illegal action on its behalf” 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  The lack of 
organization that characterizes these groups can also work the other way.  As 
Ackerman (2003) notes regarding ELF, “the lack of hierarchy means that there is no 
opportunity for a palliating influence on the decisions of more extreme ELF cells” 
(p.148).   
Despite this lack of hierarchy, certain activists do serve as figureheads for 
radical environmental and animal rights groups.  Rod Coronado, responsible for the 
firebombing of a research center at Michigan State University that caused an 
estimated 3.5 million dollars in damage, is one such figurehead for ALF.  As the ADL 
cites, “these representatives perform the essential tasks of publicizing communiqués 
from anonymous cells claiming responsibility for illegal actions and recruiting” 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  Other important 
activists serving similar roles in ALF were Katie Fedor and more recently, David 
Barbarash, who resigned in 2002 after rising law enforcement pressure  
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  In regards to 
ELF, Craig Rosebraugh has been perhaps the most vocal spokesman.  Rosebraugh has 
worked to link ELF to other social justice issues and has attempted to introduce an 
anti-government ideology into the eco-lexicon.  After mounting strain from the FBI 




respective roles in the group in 2001.  Since then, Rosebraugh has been linked to 
additional criminal incidents and continues to promote a larger anti-government 
message through his new effort with Pickering, “Arissa.”  SHAC’s primary U.S. 
spokesman has been Kevin Kjonaas, a former ALF member, who became involved 
with the movement while studying political science at the University of Minnesota 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  Kjonaas has 
been connected to the SHAC-7 incidents, a series of stalking and intimidation tactics 
aimed at HLS employees and its shareholders.  Despite raids by federal law 
enforcement and an arrest related to these incidents, Kjonaas remains active in 
SHAC. 
It appears that organizations like ELF, ALF, and SHAC play a significant role 
in the criminal activities perpetrated by environmental and animal rights extremists in 
the United States.  In the next section, I clarify who these extremists have targeted 
and what strategies they have utilized to push forward their agendas.   
Targets and Tactics 
There is no question that members of radical environmental and animal rights 
groups have caused damage to a number of targets.  As the ADL cites, “automobile 
dealerships, housing developments, forestry companies, corporate and university-
based medical research laboratories, restaurants, fur farms, and other industries” have 
been targeted across the country (www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed 
March 4, 2009).  Ackerman (2003) describes the broadening of ELF targets in recent 
years from the former mainstays of loggers and ski resorts, perhaps due to a widening 




corrals and banks to Burger Kings, private homes, and increasingly SUV’s have been 
involved in ELF attacks” (p. 153). 
Through geo-spatial analysis of the American Terrorism Study database, 
Smith and colleagues (2009) were able to determine that environmental offenders 
often lived and participated in planning activities close to their targets.  In addition, 
this investigation revealed that these offenders were much more impulsive than 
international terrorists utilizing a much shorter planning period.  In fact, Smith et. al 
(2009) note that these particular ‘single-issue terrorists’ participated in their first 
planning activity a mere fifteen days before the incident with a ‘flurry of activity’ 
right before the event.  In addition, there was often little contact among members 
prior to an incident.  These patterns mostly held up among separate analysis of 
incidents involving the Family, a group of organized ALF and ELF members that 
were responsible for a number of serious attacks.  In fact, the Family was even more 
spontaneous than the other groups in Smith and colleagues’ (2009) sample, with most 
of their preparation occurring within six days of a given incident.  Therefore, costs 
and benefits are evaluated relatively quickly.  However, the authors do note that the 
Family lived further from a given incident than the more traditional lone wolves, 
represented from their additional use of air travel and the postal service.     
As previously discussed, the amount that these groups target humans is up for 
debate (Eagan, 1996; Perlstein, 2003; Vanderheiden, 2005; Liddick, 2006; 




not result in violence and that these groups desperately seek out publicity5.  This may 
be why, as the ADL contends, that the targeting of humans is something that has been 
recently added to the rhetoric of communiqués published by radical eco-groups: 
“Threats of violence have become a troubling trend in the movement” 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  The ADL cites 
e-mails related to a recent bombing of a company in business with HLS: “Customers 
and their families are legitimate targets…you never know when your house, your car 
even, might go boom” ” (www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 
2009).  Ackerman (2003) contends that this more violent language represents a larger 
“propaganda shift,” where members have begun to question more passive techniques.  
This researcher notes that in his evaluation of the ELF he discovered some thirty-six 
separate communiqués that allude to the targeting of humans.  Although scholars like 
Vanderheiden (2005; 2008) might argue that these propaganda are the exception 
rather than the rule and stand in direct contrast to their governing philosophy6, it 
would seem that at the very least, the threatening of humans by members of radical 
eco-groups has occurred.  Ackerman (2003) clarifies the seeming contradiction: 
“While it may seem hypocritical for any ideology that accuses people of not 
recognizing the sacred equality of humanity with animals and nature to then turn 
around and debase human beings, there is evidence of misanthropism among radical 
environmentalists, reflected in the belief among at least some activists that corporate 
                                                
5 In contrast, Vanderheiden (2005) contends that the majority of these extremists do not act for greater 
society: “The intended primary audience for ELF is not the mass public, but rather the polluter or 
developer that is responsible for some ongoing act of ecological destruction” (p.438). 
6 As Vanderheiden (2005) notes, “ecotage presents the risk of violating its own principles, either by 
inadvertently causing harm to persons or in appearing to sanction violence such that the strategy could 




and government officials are evil, greedy, and corrupt exploiters with few or no 
redeeming qualities” (p. 145).  Thus, some of the more radical contingent may 
perceive that there are benefits to using violent methods against the especially 
immoral targets, regardless of the costs to the legitimacy of the movement.   
Ackerman (2003) goes on to state that while members of ELF will not directly 
target humans they are often aware of the accidental harm that may occur from 
strategies that they endorse.  In response, Taylor (2003) argues that, “despite many 
examples of strong martial rhetoric and verbal endorsements of the permissibility of 
violence from the 1980s onward, there is as yet no clear evidence that radical 
environmentalists have unleashed lethal violence or even caused great bodily harm to 
movement adversaries” (p. 176).  Clearly, the debate over the extent to which 
members of radical environmental and animal rights groups target humans is a 
complicated one and made even more complex with its tie in to the aforementioned 
definitional issues regarding the terms eco-terrorism and ecotage. 
The majority of tactics utilized by members of these groups take the form of 
vandalism of property or related disruptions (for example, the release of animals 
being utilized for medical research).  These methods are relatively harmless.  
However, environmental and animal rights extremists have employed dangerous and 
potentially lethal tactics (Eagan, 1996; Liddick, 2006).  One such tactic, the 
previously discussed tree-spiking, “involves driving long metal spikes into trees 
scheduled for harvesting on public lands.  Although the spikes do not harm the trees, 
they can be lethal when they come into contact with either a chain saw or mill blade” 




1996).  In addition, attempts by the timber industry to identify spikes through the use 
of metal detectors have been circumvented by some extremists through the use of 
ceramic or stone nails.  Despite the aforementioned opposition from high profile 
groups, tree-spiking continues to be used as a tactic to hinder the logging industry.  
However, and as previously noted, most groups have discontinued its use or have 
modified the tactic to be less dangerous to loggers (Vanderheiden, 2005).   
Other dangerous tactics committed by members of radical eco-groups include 
arson and bombings.  Ackerman (2003) notes that ELF’s, “most destructive tactic to 
date has been the copious use of arson against a variety of targets that its members 
believe endanger the earth’s environment in one way or another” (p.143).  Perhaps 
the most infamous arson conducted by any environmental or animal rights extremist 
in the U.S. took place at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado 
(www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism, Accessed March 4, 2009).  Through the 
setting of seven individual fires, the Family was able to cause over 12 million dollars 
in damages.  Since this attack, a series of arsons have targeted various housing 
developments that groups felt were built on what should have been protected land or 
were characteristic of urban sprawl.  Most notable, environmental extremists 
damaged a series of homes in San Diego causing over 50 million dollars in damage 
(Ackerman, 2003).  Recently, groups have turned their attention to setting car 
dealerships on fire, especially those that sell SUVs.  Bombings have been less popular 
as a tactic despite the easy accessibility of how-to manuals on various extremists’ 
websites (Liddick, 2006).  Most of these incidents have been thwarted by police 




attempts.  Nonetheless, enough incidents have been successful, constituting the use of 
bombs as a lucrative strategy in both making progress for the cause and in drawing 
attention to the issue (Eagan, 1996).   
Considered to be one of the most frightening tactics is the use of CBRN 
(chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons by environmental and 
animal rights extremists.  Ackerman (2003) highlights the history of CBRN weapons 
in the environmental movement, demonstrating that such an association is not as 
farfetched as would be expected given the stance most groups take against chemicals 
in the environment.  Ackerman (2003) describes the case of RISE, “a small group of 
ecological extremists who in 1972 intended to wipe out the entire human race using 
infectious diseases…the manifesto of the group declared that human beings were 
destroying the planet and that the only way to prevent this was for the human race to 
be obliterated, with a select group of people who could live in harmony with nature” 
(p. 158).  Ackerman (2003) also points to four other significant cases including one 
involving the use of anthrax to protest the British government and an incident where 
Greenpeace placed toxic waste outside the Manila U.S. Embassy.  Ackerman (2003) 
concludes that, “it is far from inconceivable that an environmentally motivated group 
like ELF would threaten or use chemical or biological agents if they believed this 
would further their cause of saving the earth from destruction” (p. 160).  However, 
Ackerman (2003) also notes that there is no ideological imperatives leading a member 
of a radical environmental or animal rights group to use CBRN weapons, nor is there 
any proof that ELF in particular has the capability to acquire these weapons.  This is 




by extremists in the future.  Nonetheless, scholars like Taylor (2003) disagree with 
Ackerman’s (2003) contention of this future possibility, arguing that even with 
anarchist groups whose ideology could support such attacks (which he separates from 
radical environmentalists and animal liberationists as previously noted), there is a 
greater possibility of more of the same.  That is, according to Taylor (2003), members 
of these groups are much more likely to commit acts of non-lethal arson and protest 
against the police and other “repressive agents of globalization.” 
Despite this vibrant discussion surrounding the terminology, philosophy 
behind, dominant groups, and the target and tactics of members of radical eco-groups, 
there is considerably less theoretical development aimed at explaining their behavior.  
The next section explores the rational choice perspective in regards to its ability to 
clarify crime and terrorism in general and its promise in application to the criminal 
and terrorist activities of environmental and animal rights extremists. 
Rational Choice and Crime 
As previously noted, the rational choice perspective maintains roots in the 
classical school of thought and its assumptions regarding human nature.  Both 
rational choice and its theoretical offspring, deterrence theory, have been extensively 
researched and empirically tested in regards to most criminal offenses.  Overall, the 
objective deterrence literature, with its focus on the role of an increase in costs 
(measured through punishment) on reducing aggregate crime rates, demonstrates 
some support for the effectiveness of such punishment that are certain, but not severe 
(Pratt et al., 2006).  For example, Sherman and Berk (1984) established that 




recidivism in the six-month follow up period when compared to counseling or 
separating the couple.  Additional research conducted on mandatory arrests has been 
supportive, but with certain caveats regarding employment and marital status 
(Sherman et al., 1992; Maxwell et al., 2002).  Other certain policing strategies like 
increased presence (Kelling et al., 1974) and crackdowns (Sherman et al., 1995) have 
been less successful at deterring crime, although hot spot patrols offer considerable 
promise (Braga, 2001).   
 The severity of punishment has been extensively examined through death 
penalty investigations (Gibbs, 1986; Tittle, 1969; Bailey, 1998; Cochran & Chamlin, 
2000).  For example, Cochran and Chamlin (2000) explored the aftermath of the well-
publicized execution of Robert Alton Harris, the first after a twenty-five year 
moratorium in the state of California.  The authors argued for both a brutalization and 
a deterrent effect based on the offense examined.  In other words, executions could 
devalue human life and consequently increase argument murders of strangers.  In 
addition, Cochran and Chamlin (2000) maintained that executions could also decrease 
rational, instrumental crimes as they would affect the cost-benefit analysis of a given 
offender.  The researchers discovered support for both offense-specific effects, adding 
to the complexity surrounding the value of severe punishments.  Overall, the 
empirical consensus suggests that such punishments are not enough to deter crime, 
supported by other severe punishment investigations like those into three strikes laws 
(Kovandzic et al., 2004; Pratt et al., 2006).  However, it is possible that environmental 
and animal rights extremists are more likely to be influenced by severe punishments 




 Perceptual deterrence research has discovered similar results regarding the 
certainty and severity of punishment (Pratt et al., 2006).  As noted in the introduction, 
Jensen and colleagues (1978) established a relationship between the perceived risk of 
a punishment and self-reported delinquency.  Overall, more modern research has 
discovered additional support for the relationship between the perception of certain 
punishments and intentions to offend.  As Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) discovered in 
their randomized experiment, the presence of a proctor (certainty), but not the loss of 
the incentive (severity), decreased the prevalence of cheating on a trivia quiz.  
Although not an illegal behavior per se, the authors argue that motivation for 
antisocial actions is informative of its criminal counterpart.  Once again, it is possible 
that members of radical eco-groups are more susceptible to severe sanctions due their 
higher stakes in conformity.   
Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) also uncovered that the prevalence to cheat varied 
by individual characteristics.  Specifically, an individual that was both self-serving 
and present-orientated was also an individual that more likely to cheat, regardless of 
sanction characteristics.  The next section reviews additional research that falls within 
this area; individual characteristics that affect the perception of sanctions and thus the 
individual decision-making of offenders. 
Individual Differences in the Perceptual Deterrence 
The consideration of individual factors, like the role that a person’s level of 
self-control or internalized morality plays, has become an important avenue of 
research and is important to take into consideration when examining differing levels 




Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Pogarsky, 2002; Nagin and 
Pogarsky, 2003).  In regards to levels of self-control, Nagin and Paternoster (1993) 
examined the significance that this measure of criminal propensity had in self-
reported decisions to commit drunk driving, theft, and sexual assault among a sample 
of college students.  The authors established that those with low self-control, “find it 
difficult to invest in conventionality because they discount future rewards in favor of 
immediate pleasures…persons with poor self-control commit crimes at a consistently 
higher rate than others because they have less to lose” (p. 490).  In other words, those 
with low self-control are also individuals that have a high “discount rate” and 
consequently are more likely to offend and less likely to invest in their own “human 
capital” (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993).  More recent research (Pogarsky, 2002; Nagin 
and Pogarsky, 2003) has continued to find support for individual differences in the 
perception of formal sanctions, particularly among those considered to have 
characteristics representative of low self-control.  Nonetheless, most scholarly work 
suggests that terrorists need self-control in order to undergo the planning and 
preparation inherent to their acts (LaFree and Ackerman, 2009).  Thus, while an 
important development in the perceptual deterrence literature, this work is less 
relevant to members of radical environmental and animal rights groups.   
The similar, albeit more pertinent, concept of moral inhibitions focuses on the 
level of morality each person carries with them.  This level of morality, in turn, 
affects an individual’s cost-benefit analysis of a particular act, along with their 
perceptions of a given legal sanction.  Although predated by a number of studies 




offer one of the most rigorous examinations of moral commitment through the use of 
a vignette-based survey of college males.  These researchers discovered that moral 
inhibitions had a significant influence on projections to commit a sexual assault.  In 
fact, formal sanctions played no part in these projections when a person’s morality 
was taken into consideration.  As the authors note, “the restraint of moral inhibitions, 
then, may under some circumstances be so strong that they preclude the consideration 
of instrumental concerns, such as the risk of formal sanctions” (p. 364).  This is an 
important consideration when examining the motivations of environmental and 
animal rights extremists.  It is possible that these extremists, many of whom adhere to 
a philosophy that speaks to the importance of valuing life, are perhaps more deterred 
by considerations of the morality of, rather than the sanctions that result from, a given 
act. 
 In 1996, Paternoster and Simpson followed up on this research with a fresh 
focus on corporate crime.  The authors argued that there are a number of factors that 
white-collar offenders take into consideration when deciding to commit a crime 
including formal and informal sanctions, moral evaluations, and organizational 
factors.  Paternoster and Simpson (1996) clarify the concept of moral inhibitions: “As 
a deontological source of constraint, moral inhibitions are not based on the 
consequences of one’s behavior.  One does not behave a certain way because of the 
expected outcomes or because it is expected by others.  Rather, moral rules are 
internalized: certain acts are not committed because it is believed to be morally 
correct not to commit them” (p. 554).  The implications of this, the authors contend, 




benefit analysis.  Second, these moral evaluations will condition the impact of this 
analysis.  Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found support for both of these 
contentions; a person’s internalized morality had a profound influence on their 
intentions to offend.  In addition, when this morality was high, other factors like the 
perceptions of formal sanctions carried little weight.  In further analyses, Paternoster 
and Simpson (1996) determined that those with strong moral inhibitions can be 
influenced to commit a crime if they sense that their company is losing ground to 
competition or is fighting an “unfair” law.  The scholars note that those with high 
levels of morality, “may be swayed into committing corporate misconduct if there is 
some appeal to a higher, more compelling, or more immediate moral principle” (p. 
577).  It is possible that this component ties in with members of radical eco-groups; 
that is, extremists may commit criminal acts when they perceive a company to 
engaged in especially immoral actions. 
Through this review, I have demonstrated that the concept of moral inhibitions 
has been successfully applied to crimes like sexual assault and white collar offenses.  
But how does the concept of moral inhibitions, or more generally, the rational choice 
perspective, relate to political violence?  In the next section I offer an interpretation of 
how criminology has been applied to this area of study.  
Rational Choice and Terrorism 
LaFree and Dugan (2004) discuss both the conceptual and methodological 
overlap and the discrepancies between more common crimes and that of terrorism; 
since both behaviors are committed by radical environmental and animal rights 




that fact that both concepts are studied in multiple disciplines, are socially 
constructed, and have definitional gaps between theory and practice.  In addition, 
both common crime and terrorism are disproportionately committed by young males 
and greatly undermine levels of social trust in communities.  LaFree and Dugan 
(2004) also point out conceptual differences; namely, terrorism involves many 
separate crimes and requires a broader response from local authorities.  Terrorists, as 
LaFree and Dugan (2004) note, are also more likely to seek exposure, conduct their 
act for political goals, see themselves as altruists, and innovate than everyday 
criminals.  Although the authors are careful to acknowledge that these conceptual 
differences are important, they conclude that, “it also seems clear that most of these 
differences can be resolved with research methods currently available to 
criminologists.  In fact, we strongly believe that the experiences of criminologists in 
analyzing crime data might make a real contribution to the study of terrorism” (p. 21).     
Based on contentions like the above from LaFree and Dugan (2004), 
criminological theory seems a promising avenue for the study of terrorism.  Recent 
research has focused on bringing the rational choice perspective to this context as it 
has been demonstrated that terrorists are often not psychopathological, but rather 
rational actors (LaFree and Ackerman, 2009).  As LaFree and Ackerman (2009) 
summarize, “the cause of terrorism in this case is the subjective perception by the 
terrorist group’s decision maker(s) that engaging in terrorist violence is the best 
possible means among the alternatives by which to accomplish the organization’s 
goals” (p. 28).  LaFree and Ackerman (2009) also conclude that both status and 




group-level behavior may decrease if perceptions of the costs of terrorism exceed the 
benefits.  These ideas may also be relevant to members of radical eco-groups, who 
could also be motivated by status and excitement and most certainly commit acts of 
terrorism when the benefits (i.e. the monkeys live another day) outweigh the costs 
(imprisonment). 
Frey and Luechinger (2002) present a rational choice model with the supply 
side represented as the marginal costs to terrorists and the demand side as the 
marginal benefit.  The authors maintain that this model assumes that terrorists are 
both extrinsically (i.e. fame) and intrinsically (i.e. convinced they are doing the right 
thing) motivated.  Frey and Luechinger (2002) also note that potential rewards must 
be taken into account when considering a rational choice model; these rewards 
include media attention, destabilization of a political system, and damage to the 
economy.  Based on this model, the authors contend that policies aimed at deterring 
terrorism may actually increase related incidents.  This backfire effect is most an 
issue when the policy in question increases the centrality of decision-making related 
to the political system and the economy.  As Frey and Luechinger (2002) explain, “it 
may well be that the increasing centralization of the economy and polity so much 
raises the attraction to terrorists to such an extent that the equilibrium amount of 
terrorism increases” (p.11).  The authors argue that the solution is to prevent such 
centralization.  However, members of radical eco-groups seem concerned with the 
mainstream political and economic system mostly in how it protects the environment 




Also from within the rational choice framework is the work of Braithwaite 
(2005), who examines terrorism from within these and other theoretical viewpoints.  
Similar to Frey and Luechinger (2002), Braithwaite (2005) sees the relationship 
between terrorism and deterrence as a possible two-sided relationship.  That is, 
deterrence policies can decrease terrorism as predicted by the theoretical propositions, 
or increase attacks resulting from a reactance or defiance effect.  As Braithwaite 
(2005) summarizes, whether deterrence ‘works’ is contingent on whether the 
deterrent effect is larger than its defiance counterpart.  Braithwaite (2005) notes that 
the deterrent effect will outweigh that of the defiance effect when (1) the freedom 
desired is not of high importance and (2) the procedures put in place to regulate a 
given freedom are perceived as fair.  Through discussion of relevant criminal justice, 
war, and public health models Braithwaite (2005) comes to the conclusion that, 
“success in reducing risk is more likely from an integrated web of regulatory controls 
that is redundantly responsive to the multiple explanatory theories grasped as relevant 
to the control problem” (p. 111).  It is likely that a successful deterrence policy aimed 
at environmental and animal rights extremists, based on Braithwaite’s contentions, is 
a policy that is perceived as fair and that promotes the utilization of legitimate 
avenues to obtain goals. 
Terrorism research from the rational choice perspective has also focused on 
the effectiveness of countermeasures.  As noted by Smith and colleagues (2009), 
“while traditional violent crime tends to be very spontaneous, terrorist violence tends 
to involve considerable preparation and the commission of substantial preliminary or 




for a higher probability of law enforcement prevention and intervention measures 
than with common crime.  Despite the previously described findings regarding 
environmental offenders and their considerable spontaneity, Smith and colleagues 
(2009) maintain that activities like the purchase of materials for incendiary devices 
can key local law enforcement into the fact that an attack is coming and is likely to 
occur near where the materials were purchased.   
Perlstein (2003) is less optimistic arguing that without the proper training and 
a partnership with the FBI, “local law enforcement cannot deal with the threat posed 
by the Earth Liberation Front” (p. 172).  Thatcher (2005) agrees that there are 
limitations to what local law enforcement can do regarding countermeasures based on 
the presumption that cities are “social structures with interests of their own” (p. 42) 
and thus, often act separately from the wishes of a large and decentralized federal 
government.  In a case study of Dearborn, Michigan and a discussion of an interview 
project administered by the Justice Department, Thatcher (2005) demonstrates that 
when local officials target certain groups they risk damaging both their reputation or 
“status honor” and their legitimacy.  Instead, Thatcher (2005) argues, local law 
enforcement should focus their efforts on what he terms “community protection” or, 
“all the tasks involved in protecting a specific place against terrorism, including target 
hardening, preventative patrol focused on likely targets of terrorist attack, response to 
threats against a specific target, and the development of emergency response plans” 
(p. 637).  These strategies would likely aid in the prevention of attacks by 




In a recent empirical review of countermeasures, Lum and colleagues (2006) 
discovered that the majority of these strategies were ineffective and some even 
increased the likelihood of terrorism.  Such ineffective strategies included the 
fortification of embassies (Enders and Sandler, 1993), UN resolutions against 
terrorism (Enders et al., 1990), military interventions/retaliatory attacks (Enders et al., 
1990; Enders and Sandler, 2000), and increasing the certainty and severity of 
punishment (Landes, 1978).7  Lum et al. (2006) also note that the one successful 
intervention, the role of metal detectors in decreasing hijackings as discussed in 
Dugan et al. (2005), may have actually increased other forms of terrorism due to 
displacement.  However, the researchers do caution that, “the available scientific 
evidence was drawn from only a handful of studies which use moderately rigorous 
research designs; this limits the strength of the evidence and the conclusions that can 
be drawn from it” (p. 1).  Lum and colleagues (2006) conclude that, “the most 
important policy recommendation to emerge from this review is that the wide-array of 
anti-terrorism policies need to be evaluated for effectiveness or at least be better 
informed by existing scientific evaluations” (p. 33).   
Since the review by Lum and colleagues (2006) was conducted, additional 
empirical evaluations of countermeasures have been carried out (Pridemore and 
Freilich, 2007; LaFree et al., 2009).  One such evaluation by Pridemore and Freilich 
(2007) assessed policies aimed at combating anti-abortion violence.  The authors 
proposed that those carrying out violent attacks were, “unlikely to be deterred, but 
they may respond to statutes with increased violence and harassment because they 
                                                
7 For instance, the 1986 U.S. attack on Libya following Libya’s involvement in a bombing in West 




perceive they are losing a battle that to them is about life and death itself” (p. 612).  
Therefore, the authors predicted a backlash effect; that is, states with laws considered 
supportive of abortion clinics and rights would also have higher rates of anti-abortion 
violence.  On the other side of the argument is the contention that, “the pro-life 
movement, while vehemently opposed to abortion, have not rejected mainstream 
society and still accept government authority” (p. 613).  Consequently, Pridemore and 
Freilich (2007) also anticipated a deterrent effect; specifically, states with laws 
protecting abortion clinics and rights, considered to demonstrate a high level of 
certainty and severity of punishment, would have lower levels of anti-abortion 
violence.  Interestingly, the authors discovered null findings and conclude that while, 
“laws serve important symbolic values they may have little practical effect” (p. 623).  
This contention is important to evaluate on the other side of the political spectrum; in 
particular, how have laws influenced members of radical environmental and animal 
rights groups? 
Another recent addition to the countermeasure literature is the investigation of 
six major British strategies in Northern Ireland conducted by LaFree and colleagues 
(2009).  These researchers discovered that the majority of the policies examined 
produced a backlash effect.  In other words, three of the six military interventions 
increased the likelihood of the prohibited behavior and two had no effect.  As LaFree 
et al. (2009) note, “the only support for deterrence among six interventions was for a 
major military surge, which significantly reduced the hazard of new attacks” (p. 19).    
All in all, the results of rational choice based explorations of terrorism, 




empirical evaluations (LaFree, et al. 2009), are mixed at best.  As Dugan (2009) 
contends, “effectively deterring terrorism will require an evolving understanding of 
the complexity of the terrorist players and situational context” (p. 744).  So how do 
these particular strategies relate to radical eco-group players?  The next section 
reviews a series of unevaluated countermeasures measures; namely three pieces of 
federal sentencing legislation targeted at reducing the illegal activities of 
environmental and animal rights extremists through increasing the severity of 
punishment.  
Countermeasures and Radical Environmental and Animal Rights Groups 
A handful of pieces of legislation have intended to reduce the criminal 
conduct of environmental and animal rights extremists in the U.S. (Walker, 2007).  
One such piece of legislation, the Stop Terrorism Property Act of 2003 (STOP), made 
any act committed by a member of a radical environmental or animal rights group a 
federal crime.  This act, along with the Eco-Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, has 
never been passed due to potential First Amendment violations.  However, their 1988 
and 1992 predecessors, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADA) and the Animal 
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (AEPA) and their recent successor, the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (AETA), have been signed into law.   
All three of these federal sentencing acts have their own unique history and 
political context, yet all three share the same implication; namely, the use of 
sentencing enhancements for crimes, many of which were previously considered to be 
vandalism.  Thus, this legislation has implications for a defendant’s treatment and 




through treating environmental and animal rights offenders as terrorists in the federal 
system.  Research has demonstrated that those charged as such already receive longer 
sentences (Smith, 1994) and that the label of “terrorist” is the most significant 
predictor of sentence length in multivariate analyses (Smith and Damphousse, 1996).  
In fact, Smith and Damphousse (1996) discovered that by adding political motive to 
their analyses, they greatly increased the explained variance of their model.  The 
authors summarize: “By identifying the defendant’s use, or threat to use, violence to 
‘achieve political or social goals,’ the government initiates a strategy that begins with 
the relaxation of investigatory regulations, increases expenditures in manpower and 
funding, alters prosecutorial strategies, and ultimately lengthens the sentence of the 
politically motivated offender” (p. 313).  The authors go on to clarify the sentencing 
disparity: “The absence of a jury, a reduction in the standard of proof used in civil 
suits of ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ and the allowance of ‘uncharged and 
unconvicted conduct’ as evidence all provide for upward departures in the sentencing 
of terrorists” (Smith and Damphousse, 1996: 314).  Follow-up research conducted by 
these authors (Smith and Damphousse, 1998) demonstrated the roles that pleading 
“not guilty” and the political environment (toward proactively prosecuting terrorists) 
played in the sentencing disparity of terrorist offenders.   
Therefore, ADA, AEPA, and AETA can all add to the offender’s sentence 
through either prosecution under that particular legislation or through treating the 
offender as a political criminal in the federal system.  From a rational choice and 
specifically a deterrence framework, these acts increase the costs of committing crime 




also the first steps by the federal government to respond to the implied danger of 
members of radical eco-groups, making them significant events in the timeline of 
U.S. countermeasures.  The next sub-sections detail each act’s history and penalties. 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADA) was initially unrelated to the 
activities of radical eco-groups.  It was Idaho Senator James McClure (R), as Smith 
(2008) describes, that proposed the inclusion of a subsection criminalizing tree-
spiking after arguing that members of these groups had injured a number of loggers.  
Specifically, the use of any “hazardous or injurious device on federal land with the 
intent to obstruct or harass the harvesting of timber” (Smith, 2008: 546) can be met 
with a twenty-year prison sentence depending upon the circumstances of the offense.  
Smith (2008) documents the passing of this important legislation in conjunction with 
a larger political movement against environmental and animal rights activists, 
including the first use of the term eco-terrorism.  Therefore, while this act is focused 
on tree-spiking, it was part of a larger effort to symbolically legislate the criminal 
conduct of members of radical environmental and animal rights groups. 
The Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 
The Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) is another important piece of 
legislation.  As Walker (2007) notes, “AEPA increased penalties on a person who 
‘intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise by 
intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any property (including 




damage exceeding $25,000 to that enterprise, or conspires to do so’” (p. 104).  
Walker (2007) clarifies that this act does not aim to punish “lawful disturbances” and 
that the, “penalties are differentiated into four classifications (1) economic damage; 
(2) major economic damage; (3) serious bodily injury; and (4) death” (p. 99).  Each 
classification is associated with its own sentence; in fact, there is a continuum of 
penalties beginning with fines and restitution and ending with life imprisonment.  
Walker (2007) contends that AEPA does not have First Amendment concerns due to 
the specificity of the language used in regards to protesting; in other words, protesting 
is not an act that is punishable under this legislation.  Although aimed at actions 
against animal enterprises, this act likely had an impact on the broader movement of 
radical activities irrespective of ideology.   
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (AETA) is the most recent 
addition to the countermeasure milieu.  AETA, “enhanced penalties for “acts 
disruptive of an ‘animal enterprise’ and leading to a ‘reasonable fear’ on the part of 
that enterpriser’s owner for their property, including boycotts or other forms of 
previously lawful protest leading to ‘losses or increased costs’ exceeding $10,000” 
(Vanderheiden, 2008: 306).  This act also broadened the offense categories of AEPA 
with a focus on interstate travel and the mail service (Walker, 2007).  AETA 
specifically addressed the problem of third party targeting; as previously noted this is 
a tactic made infamous by SHAC, whose members harass companies they feel 




the AEPA’s scope and power would increase, it would become a more effective tool 
for prosecutors” (p. 117).  
AETA has been the most controversial of the federal sentencing legislation 
aimed at members of radical eco-groups.  In a letter to Congress, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) argued AETA, “criminalizes First Amendment activities 
such as demonstrating, leafleting, undercover investigations, and boycotts.  The bill is 
overly broad, vague, and unnecessary because federal criminal laws already provide a 
wide range of punishments for unlawful targeting of animal enterprises” 
(www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen, Accessed March 30, 2009).  The ACLU seems to take 
the most issue with the part of AETA that penalizes disruptive activities; these are 
activities that could include the aforementioned leafleting and boycotts.  The ACLU 
also contends that AETA, “would also make the expanded crime a predicate for Title 
III federal criminal wiretapping.  This provision could be used for widespread 
domestic surveillance of animal rights organizations” (www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen, 
Accessed March 30, 2009). 
All three of these federal sentencing acts, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
the Animal Enterprise Act of 1992, and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006, 
demonstrate key pieces of legislation that have increased the costs of crime by 
escalating criminal justice penalties.  It is unclear, however, whether these laws have 
had an impact and whether that impact has been positive or negative.  In the next 
section, I review another probable influence in the decision-making of members of 




Morality and Terrorism 
As previously established, the majority of research from the rational choice 
perspective on terrorism has taken the form of countermeasure evaluation.  Little to 
no research has analyzed such measures through perceptions in the vein of Jensen and 
colleagues (1978), and even less has focused on the individual differences (i.e. self-
control or morality) of such perceptions.  Again remembering that terrorism is a 
deliberate act often involving planning (Smith et al. 2009), the research on low-self 
control in regards to perceptions of punishment seems less relevant.  On the other 
hand, the concept of moral inhibitions seems especially pertinent given the 
aforementioned philosophical underpinnings of members of radical eco-groups.  In 
addition, the recent discussion of morality, both on this individual-level and with a 
more macro-level abstraction, has come to the forefront of the discussion on terrorist 
motivation (Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008; Wheatley and McCauley, 2008).     
For instance, Bouhana and Wikstrom (2008) recently developed an 
explanation of terrorism through a morality framework.  In fact, these researchers 
define terrorism as moral actions, or “actions defined by what is the right or wrong 
thing to do or not to do in a particular circumstance” (p. 35).  The authors argue that it 
is important, first and foremost, to explain why an individual would consider 
terrorism in the first place taking into account most people would never even 
contemplate such an action.  Bouhana and Wikstrom (2008) argue that terrorism as an 
“action alternative” is chosen and seen as viable based on a person’s individual 
morality (values and emotions) and the moral context (rules and enforcement).  The 




change in promoting acts of terrorism, it is essential to focus on identifying which 
(and how) such factors influence the emergence and change of the moral contexts in 
which people develop and act” (p. 36).  In essence, from this perspective morality is 
viewed as both an individual-level construct as discussed in the moral inhibition 
literature and a macro-level context that can either facilitate or impede terrorism as a 
tactic.  Therefore, it is not that people become more or less moral internally, but that 
terrorism is seen as a less moral option in certain environments.  
Wheatley and McCauley (2008) discuss the importance of moral context in 
their case study of the especially brutal Luxor massacre and its influence on the 
decline of Egyptian terrorism.  Specifically, the attack was met with derision from the 
Egyptian citizens, who at one point assisted the police in capturing the offenders.  As 
the authors note, even members of the Islamic Group denounced the massacre, 
creating a division in the ranks.  These moral repercussions combined with the 
economic impact of the attacks, most pronounced in a substantial decline in tourism, 
lead to an overall disillusionment with Islamic extremism.  This in turn allowed the 
government to have greater leeway and influence in their countermeasure strategy.  
As Wheatley and McCauley (2008) summarize, “IG and its attack at Luxor have to 
been seen as part of a dynamic system of terrorist attacks and government response 
that culminated in divisions and weakness among the terrorists that occurred in 
association with alienation of their base of sympathy in the Egyptian population” 
(2009:4).  The authors also contend that it is the moral dimension that, “emerged as 
decisive in the struggle between terrorists and the government” (p. 23) and that, “a 




It is possible that events in the history of radical environmental and animal rights 
groups have had a similar influence. 
Dugan and colleagues (2008) provide an argument along the same lines in 
their empirical investigation into the desistance of two terrorist organizations: the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).  Dugan et al. (2008) test three main 
hypotheses regarding the desistance of these groups.  First, group-level desistance is 
related to disillusionment with ASALA’s increasing tendency to target non-Turkish 
citizens, culminating with the lethal incident at the Orly airport in 1983.  Second, 
terrorism will increase before the Orly incident in response to more attacks against 
non-Turks and decrease after the incident has occurred.  Finally, unsuccessful attacks 
will lead to fewer incidents in the future.  Overall, the researchers find support for 
these hypotheses and maintain that, “Orly was a tipping point not only for ASALA 
operations but also for its public image.  Broad targeting, extortion, and retailing of 
mercenary services effectively undermined the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of both 
the diaspora and the West” (p. 243).  Interestingly, ASALA was not the only group 
undermined by this attack, but JCAG, a group on the other side of the political 
spectrum, was affected as well.  This spillover is likely due to a public 
pronouncement against terrorist activity, JCAG’s targeting strategies notwithstanding.  
Although the authors do not reference morality as responsible for ASALA’s and 
JCAG’s desistance, it can be inferred that a public pronouncement against terrorism is 




increased the costs of being associated with terrorism by making such tactics immoral 
to the larger community regardless of goals or circumstance.         
Eidelson and McCauley (2009) recently brought the focus to U.S. domestic 
incidents with a look at the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing.  Through 
examining correlations in the American National Election Surveys, the authors 
noticed a peak in support for right-wing extremism right before the bombing, and 
then a substantial decrease thereafter.  More specifically, a scale composed of items 
measuring responses that indicated that the “government is out of control” and 
“minorities are a threat” reached its highest number in 1994 and then steadily dropped 
off.  Eidelson and McCauley (2009) conclude that there is a connection between 
public opinion and right-wing terrorism.  However, the researchers do not specify the 
role of a moral environment as the mechanism in that connection, but rather a related 
decrease in public sympathy for the ideology.  Once again, it is possible that other 
U.S. terrorist events, specifically those perpetrated by members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups, had a similar influence on support for their 
movement. 
Summary 
In this review of the literature, I have clarified the debate behind the 
construction of the terms eco-terrorism and ecotage, discussed the philosophical 
background of those that adhere to biocentrism and deep ecology, reviewed the most 
influential of the radical environmental and animal rights groups with a focus on their 
structure and important leaders, and examined the targets and tactics that groups have 




micro and macro-level conceptualizations of morality, and their applicability to 
terrorism as a whole and specifically, to the criminal and terrorist conduct of 
members of radical eco-groups.  Based on this assessment, in the next chapter I 
describe the quantitative and qualitative data collection process, provide the 
operationalization of important variables, identify the related research questions and 





Chapter 3: The Current Study 
 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the lack of empirical work and theoretical 
conceptualization aimed at explaining the illegal activities of members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups.  My discussion of the rational choice 
perspective displayed the wealth of research testing the impact of how an increase in 
costs, namely through certain, severe, and swift sanctions, affects illegal behavior.  
However, my review also showed that the majority of such policies measured at the 
aggregate-level are ineffective; the little research on terrorist countermeasures mirrors 
these findings.  Nonetheless, the potential deterrent of policies aimed specifically at 
members of environmental and animal rights extremists remain untested.  In this 
dissertation, I will examine the possible deterrent impact of three sentencing acts 
designed to have an effect on the illegal behavior of members of these groups.   
My review also demonstrated the significance of the perceptual deterrence 
literature, and specifically, the importance in considering individual differences in 
perceptions.  In particular, the work on moral inhibitions is especially pertinent given 
that the philosophical background of environmental and animal rights activists is 
based on concepts of biocentrism and deep ecology.  As previously discussed, 
Bouhana and Wikstrom (2008) emphasize this individual-level morality and add the 
idea of a moral context when explaining terrorism.  As Wheatley and McCauley 
(2008) demonstrate, especially brutal terrorist attacks can change the context in which 
terrorism is evaluated and make it more likely that future acts of terrorism will be 
judged as an inappropriate action alternative.  Eidelson and McCauley’s (2009) 




history; this event likely increased the costs of being associated with terrorism for 
those with a right-wing ideology.  It is probable that events within the radical eco-
movement, especially ones seen as violent and specific to an environmental or animal 
rights ideology, have had the same impact in regards to changing the climate.      
In this dissertation, I evaluate how these different theoretical elements affect 
the amount and type of incidents perpetuated by members of radical eco-groups, 
along with the individual-level decision-making of these members.  That is, I seek to 
answer, Are members of radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred by 
legal sanctions, morality, both, or neither?  Based on a rational choice framework, I 
hypothesize that members of these groups are deterred by considerations of both 
sanctions and morality.     
In this chapter, I outline the procedures for the qualitative data collection, 
namely interviews with environmental and animal rights activists.  I also detail the 
construction of the quantitative data and report descriptive statistics for this dataset.  
Table 3.1 lists the sources used for this construction, along with the years they cover 
and the number of incidents included.  I describe the two primary sources, along with 
the other related chronologies employed to further supplement the dataset.   
Data 
Interview Data 
As noted, I collected qualitative data in order to establish the appropriateness 
of the rational choice framework in explaining those motivated by an environmental 
or animal rights ideology.  Specifically, I wanted to pinpoint the role that legal 




environmental and animal rights activists.  In particular, a micro-level 
conceptualization like that of moral inhibitions is best explored by asking participants 
about how they frame their decision-making when it comes to participation in 
criminal and even terrorist acts.  As Fontana and Frey (1998) note, “interviewing is 
one of the most common and most powerful ways to understand our fellow human 
beings” (p. 47).   
 Sample 
I conducted 25 interviews8 with various environmental and animal right 
activists in a large northeastern city.  My only criterion for selection was that 
interviewees participated in some sort of environmental or animal rights motivated 
activism (i.e. protest/demonstration, lobbying, etc.).  The activists were initially 
recruited from meet-up.com (e-mail listservs, related postings) and through various 
organizational websites.  From there, a snowball or chain sample was activated; in 
other words, I asked one participant for their ideas on another suitable participant and 
then that interviewee for another interviewee and so on until the final set of 
interviews were obtained.  Finding an initial informant was difficult as many activists 
were concerned with the consequences of even seemingly peaceful activity9.  
However, nearly every participant that replied to our posting or request for an 
interview followed through by attending and remained for all questions.  I also relied 
on Fontana and Frey’s (1998) suggestions for gaining access and trust: understanding 
language, presentation, and establishing rapport.  For instance, I was careful to dress 
                                                
8 It should be noted that around 50% of the interviews were conducted in a conference room of a 
terrorism research center.  This may have unduly influenced certain respondents to underreport their 
criminal involvement. 
9 For example, one participant told me that their activities primarily involved handing out vegan 




in environmental/animal friendly attire (no fur or leather) and I made sure to connect 
with the participants on a personal level before beginning the interview and during 
the introductory questions.  However, the environmental and animal rights movement 
remains a difficult group of people to gain entry to, particularly the more radical 
contingent.  I should acknowledge that the conclusions I draw from these interviews 
are limited by my sampling method and selection criteria, which resulted in a 
primarily law-abiding group without extensive criminal participation in support of 
environmental or animal rights causes.  Nevertheless, 8 of my 25 participants 
admitted in interviews to having a criminal record associated with their participation 
in the movement, but mainly from low-level offenses like trespassing. 
All in all, the sample was composed of a good balance10 of both 
environmental and animal rights activists and both men and women, but was 
predominately young (mostly between the ages of 18-25, but as old as 65), educated 
(nearly all respondents were in college or held a bachelor’s degree), and white.  
Because my sampling methods were yielding young participants, I oversampled older 
interviewees for the last three months of the collection effort.  About 3/5 of the 
sample was affiliated with mainstream environmental or animal rights 
organizations11.   
I also examined a different sort of participant for comparison purposes.  This 
participant was one that had been highly active in the movement, but had become 
extremely disillusioned with its principles and was at the other end of the continuum 
                                                
10 These characteristics of the sample (i.e. gender, age) were not collected systematically.  Once again, 
the sample was not collected randomly so may not be representative of the larger population. 




in regards to ideology.  Despite the change in beliefs, their motivations were similar 
to others in the sample in regards to rational decision-making.         
 Procedures 
Appendix 1.1 is the consent form with the questions I asked of all participants.  
I was influenced by Liddick’s (2006) questionnaire when choosing my introductory 
questions.  For the remainder of the interview, I chose questions that I felt were 
general enough to start the participant talking and that left room for me to ask 
additional questions.  Therefore, the interviews were face-to-face and semi-
structured12, as I asked a series of prescribed questions, but then followed-up with 
questions when I wanted participants to clarify or expand on specific points that were 
raised.  Interviews were taped and then transcribed.  Due to a lack of funding, no 
financial incentive was given to the participants.   
As for other qualitative methods, pre-coded surveys and questionnaires, 
although useful in other research venues, do not allow researchers to explore new 
directions and information, beyond that known when the original questionnaire was 
constructed.  Moreover, pure participant observation without full disclosure in this 
context raised major ethical issues.  Ethnography, ethnographic methods, and 
nonparticipant observation would provide a rich picture of the lives of these activists, 
but the dynamic nature of the groups and of the sites renders such an analysis nearly 
impossible.  For instance, in preliminary interviews I learned that participants often 
become disillusioned with the movement at times limiting their participation.  More 
                                                
12 Fontana and Frey (1998) explain the difference between structured and unstructured interviewing: 
“The former aims at capturing precise data of a codeable nature in order to explain behavior within 
preestablished categories, whereas the latter is used in an attempt to understand the complex behavior 
of members of society without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry” 




specifically, one participant told me that being involved in what he termed a “losing 
cause” was often frustrating enough for him to become disengaged for months at a 
time. 
Eco-Incidents Database 
I developed the Eco-Incidents Database (EID) from two primary sources: (1) 
the Global Terrorism Database for terrorism cases and, (2) the Foundation for 
Biomedical Research Illegal Incidents Chronology for all criminal cases.  I will 
describe both sources below.  I also explain the process that was used to extract and 
assess cases for inclusion in the EID.   
Global Terrorism Database 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is the most comprehensive 
unclassified database on terrorism that exists; information on over 80,000 domestic 
and international incidents has been collected and released covering the years 1970 to 
2008.  Incident sources include wire services, domestic and foreign newspapers, and 
U.S. State Department reports.  To be incorporated into the GTD, the event must be 
intentional, must involve violence or the threat of violence, and must be committed 
by sub-national actors (Global Terrorism Database Codebook, 2009).  In addition, the 
incident must include two of the following three criteria13: (1) a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal, (2) an objective to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to 
a larger audience, and/or, (3) action outside of international humanitarian law (Global 
Terrorism Database Codebook, 2009).  The cases can then be selected based on 
                                                
13 This was done retroactively for cases pre-1998.  It should also be noted that the pre-1998 data was 




whether they satisfy each of these criteria.  For the purpose of this investigation, I 
chose cases that met at least two of the three criteria.   
The GTD contains information on more than 120 variables including the date, 
city, country, target, weapon, number of fatalities, number of injuries, and additional 
information if the incident was a kidnapping or hijacking.  Consequently, the data 
amassed by the GTD provide a rich picture of terrorism and incident characteristics.  
From the GTD, I created a subsample of incidents from those events with solely an 
ecological and/or animal rights based motivation that occurred within the United 
States between 1970 and 2007.  The sample of cases was primarily compiled by 
searching the U.S. cases based on groups identified from secondary sources (Liddick, 
2006, U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1993).  I also 
conducted a comments/summary search of key terms (“animal,” “ecology,” “earth,” 
and “environment”) in order to capture those events not tied to a group.  In the end, I 
included 87 GTD incidents from the years 1970 to 2007. 
Foundation for Biomedical Research 
The Global Terrorism Database, while the most comprehensive of existing 
terrorism datasets, was insufficient to study the research questions as a standalone 
source.  This is because much of the activity of interest to this particular investigation 
did not fit the definition or the criterion of terrorism as defined by the GTD.  
Specifically, the GTD does not include criminal incidents unless they also qualify as 
terrorist incidents.  Thus, other data sources were sought out to supplement the 87 
terrorist incidents in the GTD.  Through identifying and evaluating a series of open 




Foundation for Biomedical Research, was chosen as the main supplementary data 
source. 
 The Foundation for Biomedical Research (FBR) collects incidents on all 
criminal activities conducted by members of radical eco-groups in the United States 
and has amassed a chronology covering the years 1981 through the present.  The data 
are publicly available on the foundation’s website and are compiled primarily through 
U.S. media sources, which the foundation checks regularly for incidents perpetrated 
in the name of environmental or animal rights, although group communiqués are also 
utilized.  Despite the fact that the FBR’s chronology is incredibly rich and covers the 
main variables of interest to this dissertation, it could not be taken on face value.  
First and foremost, the foundation takes a partisan position in the battle against 
environmental and animal rights extremists.  In fact, the Foundation for Biomedical 
Research has served as a strong lobby against such groups through their formation of 
the Animal Enterprise Protection Coalition and support for the Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act (www.nabr.org/animal activism, accessed May 15, 2009).  Second, the 
use of sources like group communiqués for incidents can be questionable.  In fact, 
members of ALF and ELF have been known to claim responsibility for acts that they 
either had nothing to do with or were never committed in the first place as evident 
from the FBR’s own data set14.   
For these reasons, efforts were made to independently verify all sources on the 
FBR’s chronology.  I was able to authenticate the majority of case sources by 
conducting online searches; those cases that were not confirmed through the source 
                                                
14 For instance, one case describes an animal rights activist calling the police to say damage was done, 




listed or another open source were primarily low-level incidents like the spray-
painting of a building.  The FBR incidents were also recoded so that they matched up 
with the GTD’s coding schema and were checked against the GTD cases to avoid 
duplication (based on fields such as date, location, and perpetrator).   
Supplemental Chronologies 
The unification of the GTD cases with the FBR chronology created the most 
inclusive data set on crime perpetrated by members of environmental and animal 
rights groups in existence, hereafter referred to as the Eco-Incidents Database (EID).  
However, to further the EID’s validity and to add to the pre-1981 criminal cases not 
included in the FBR chronology, a number of other open source chronologies were 
examined as shown in Table 3.1.  The Arnold Chronology is taken from Ron 
Arnold’s (1997) book Ecoterror, while the Anti-Defamation League, Fur 
Commission, NAIA (National Alliance for Animals), and the Southern Poverty Law 
Center include incidents collected from news sources on their respective websites.  
The Seattle Times chronology is from an article published in 2006, listing their source 
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  The United States Department of Agriculture 
in conjunction with the Department of Justice (1993) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (2008) have also produced reports with chronologies.  The Leader 
and Probst (from their 2005 article) and the Hewitt Chronologies (from Political 
Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: A Chronology), along with events from 
a Smith and Damphousse (2009) article, were also examined. 
Considering once again that some of these authors (Ron Arnold has often 




Commission has an obvious stake in the debate) may have an investment in the issue, 
an attempt was made to independently verify the incident through another open 
source if established as a unique case.  In other words, every incident was checked for 
a secondary news source.  However, due to the nature of these cases (spray-painting a 
wall will not typically come to the attention of even a local newspaper), I was only 
able to verify 30% of the cases.  If contradictory information was discovered from a 
news source (i.e. different damage amount), I took information from the one with the 
later date assuming that this coincides with additional time for news sources to verify 
information.       
In the end, I checked 1500 incidents from various sources for inclusion in the 
EID regardless of a secondary source, which resulted in 1056 unique incidents after 
removing duplicates.  In order to eliminate duplicates, I checked the date, perpetrator, 
and location and removed the incident based on these criteria if it was not one of 
multiple incidents (often designated in the summary as one of many attacks on the 
same day related to each other but at different locations).   
Table 3.2 displays the descriptive statistics for the primary variables collected 
for the EID.  Of the 1056 incidents from 1970 through 2007, 91% were successful 
attacks.  This suggests that criminal events perpetrated by members of radical eco-
groups often take place before law enforcement can intervene.  However, this variable 
is probably skewed in that foiled or unsuccessful attacks (i.e. a bomb that does not 
detonate) are less likely to come to the attention of media and thus be found in open 




Interestingly, and despite all the attention from federal and state law 
enforcement, only 1 incident resulted in a fatality.  On February 8, 1990, Dr. Hyram 
Kitchen, the Dean of the Veterinary School of the University of Tennessee, was shot 
and killed in his driveway.  One month prior, there were several threats by animal 
rights groups to kill one veterinary dean per month for 12 months, although no one 
was ever charged with the murder.  The incident drew nationwide publicity as police 
issued an alert to all university officials prior to and subsequent to the attack.     
The number of injuries caused by environmental and animal right extremists 
is also extremely low.  In total, 8 incidents resulted in 1 injury and 1 incident was 
responsible for 2 injuries.  The most noteworthy of these incidents occurred on May 
8, 1987, when George Alexander, a logger, was severely injured by a tree-spike.  As 
previously discussed, this event was the impetus for the tree-spiking clause added to 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.  Judy Bari, a prominent leader of Earth First! noted in the 
Albion Monitor that, “When George Alexander was nearly decapitated working a 
shift at the Cloverdale mill, I was just getting interested in Earth First! and it kind of 
backed me off, because of this tree-spiking thing” 
(http://www.albionmonitor.com/bari/jbint-14.html, Accessed June 7, 2010).  Bari was 
later behind a larger nonviolent movement that publicly renounced tree-spiking as a 
tactic through a partnership with loggers.      
Another interesting descriptive result is that members of radical eco-groups 
rarely use weapons.  According to Table 3.2, only 19% of the cases are associated 
with a weapon.  These incidents most often involved the use of an incendiary.  




example, the pouring of sugar in a gas tank of a bulldozer).  Around 12% of the 
incidents are connected with the use of either one of these weapons.  Eleven attacks 
involved the use of a biological or chemical weapon.  Perhaps the most interesting of 
these events occurred on November 23, 1997, when an animal rights group known as 
the Justice Department contaminated turkeys with a lethal substance in several 
supermarkets.  However, this attack resulted in no known deaths or illnesses.   
The most difficult variable to code in the data was the distinction between 
terrorism and ordinary crime.  Using the guidelines set up by the Global Terrorism 
Database, I was able to identify 59% of the events in the EID as meeting the 
mandatory conditions (intentional, involves violence or the threat of violence, and 
committed by sub-national actors) and two of the three criteria for inclusion as a 
terrorist attack (a political, economic, religious, or social goal, an objective to coerce, 
intimidate, or conveys a message to a larger audience, and/or, action outside of 
international humanitarian law).  The most complicated decision-making involved the 
GTD’s mandatory factors regarding violence or the threat of violence.  As shown in 
Table 3.2, incidents that targeted people (19% of the data) were much more clearly 
defined as terrorism.  However, I was often forced to deliberate on how much 
threatened or actual violence is intrinsic to property crimes.  As a whole, I 
distinguished such crime as terrorism when the damage was extensive or irreversible.  
Thus, this distinction defined terrorism as everything from the releasing of animals to 
the setting of an animal-testing facility on fire.  Most of the events classified as 
terrorism in the EID took the form of a facility or infrastructure attack (85%), where 




of attacks in the EID to be terrorism, but so few were associated with traditional 
conceptualizations of violence.  In other words, to an overwhelming degree, members 
of radical eco-groups in the United States principally look to obtain their goals 
through damaging the physical structure of a business rather than harming the actual 
people working for such a business.    
Although violence and weapon use was uncommon in the EID, damage was 
very widespread.  As Table 3.2 demonstrates, almost 70% of events in the EID 
involved some sort of damage, although the extent of this damage is largely 
unknown.  Only 22% of the incidents involving damage listed a specific monetary 
amount.  Of the incidents where a damage amount was given, the average loss was 
$830,691, with a total of $193,551,024.  The EID incident associated with the most 
damage is the aforementioned Environmental Liberation Front arson of a 
condominium complex in San Diego, resulting in an estimated loss of 50 million 
dollars.  Events like this one may explain why so much attention has been paid to 
these groups by federal and local law enforcement; that is, while these extremists 
appear not to be a major violent threat, they do seem to one that can be destructive of 
property. 
Analyses and Variables  
In the following section, I describe each analysis (along with detailing the 
independent and dependent variables for the quantitative questions), organized by 
research question and related hypotheses.  Appendix 1.2 is the codebook for the EID 




statistics for all incidents, terrorist incidents, damage incidents, animal-only incidents, 
and environmental-only incidents involved in the analysis.   
Question 1: Are those who are motivated by an environmental and/or animal 
rights ideology sensitive to considerations of legal sanctions and moral 
evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses?   
 
 My first research question explores how appropriate the rational choice 
framework is in explaining the behavior of those motivated by an environmental 
and/or animal rights ideology.  I use my qualitative data to pinpoint whether these 
activists weigh costs and benefits and if they act based on expected utility.  Based on 
the aforementioned research regarding the appropriateness of the rational choice 
perspective in explaining terrorism and on the philosophical underpinnings of these 
actors, I expect considerations of both legal sanctions and moral evaluations to affect 
their decision-making.  Consequentially, my first hypothesis is:  
H1: Those who are motivated by an environmental and/or animal 
rights ideology are sensitive to considerations of both legal sanctions 




All in all, it is necessary to establish that activists consider the legal and moral 
ramifications from a criminal and even terrorist act in their decision-making on a 
micro-level, before I quantitatively examine their activity on a macro-level.  
However, I do acknowledge that my sample is not random and as previously 
recognized, may not represent the more radical contingent of the movement.  
Therefore, this hypothesis cannot be formally tested per se, but allows a framework 
for gaining insight into the motivations of activists. 
Question 2: How effective has recent U.S. federal legislation been in 
decreasing the criminal conduct of members of radical environmental and 
animal rights groups? 
 
My second research question focuses on the role of legal sanctions, 
particularly three federal sentencing acts associated with severe penalties, in deterring 
the criminal conduct of members of radical eco-groups.  Deterrence theory will be 
supported if these sentencing acts are associated with decreases in the total number of 
and those incidents considered to be serious (terrorist and involving damage).  I use 
these three outcomes because even if the legislation is written for a specific behavior 
(i.e. Anti-Drug Abuse Act for tree-spiking, Animal Enterprise Protection Act for all 
criminal acts against animal enterprises), it could also have a spillover effect to other 
illegal activity.  For instance, Smith (2008) argues that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act had 
implications beyond tree-spiking due to the first use of the term “eco-terrorism” in a 
congressional setting and the overall movement towards criminalizing these 
behaviors.  Therefore, in response to a movement toward greater enforcement, the 
perceived costs of illegal conduct could have increased for all members of radical 




incidents.  For these reasons, it is important to look at total incidents and those 
considered serious (involving damage or considered terrorism) as a starting point.  
Thus, my hypotheses are: 
H2a: U.S. federal sentencing legislation will decrease the number of total 
incidents and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated by members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups. 
H2b: U.S. federal sentencing legislation will decrease the number of terrorist 
and damage incidents and the hazard of a new terrorist and damage incident 
perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups. 
 
Although spillover effects are a possibility, the legislation should have the most 
influence on the behaviors it was designed to control.  In other words, ADA should 
decrease environmentally motivated attacks, especially tree-spiking15.  On the other 
hand, AEPA and AETA should influence animal rights attacks more than other 
incidents.  In addition, it is possible that a decrease in incidents perpetrated in the 
name of the environment led to an increase in animal rights motivated attacks.  It is 
important to check for these types of substitution effects.  Therefore, my additional 
hypotheses are: 
H2c: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies16, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for the environment 
will decrease following the implementation of ADA. 
H2d: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for animal rights will 
decrease following the implementation of AEPA and AETA. 
 
In summary, I evaluate the relationship between the legislation of interest and 
the total, terrorist, damage, environment-only, and animal rights-only activity 
                                                
15 Due to the small number of tree-spiking attacks in the EID, I cannot analyze this as an outcome in 
the time-series and series-hazard analyses.  However, of the 31 tree-spiking attacks, 28 occurred after 
the implementation of the law suggesting it was ineffective. 





perpetrated by environmental and animal rights extremists before and after the 
legislation was enacted.   
Analyses 
In order to evaluate these relationships, I use both (1) interrupted time-series 
models to determine a change in the frequency of attacks and, (2) series hazard 
models to ascertain any effect on the time between attacks.  The former is a strategy 
that has frequently been employed to study the effect of interventions and is valuable 
when research seeks to evaluate the outcome of such interventions on a dependent 
variable over time.   
Interrupted time-series analysis, unlike ordinary least-squares regression, 
addresses the temporally-dependent “noise” inherent to this type of data (McDowall 
et al., 1980).  Sources of dependency can include a trend in the data (a steady increase 
or decrease over the entire series) and seasonality (i.e. a decrease in attacks during 
winter months when people spend more time at home).  In addition, adjacent errors 
may be correlated in time-sensitive data, where each observation may be related to 
the previous observation.  Thus, it is imperative to ensure a stationary trend before 
conducting any analysis.  I test for stationary trends with the Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic and find no evidence of a unit root.  Therefore, I can now estimate changes in 
the series that are due to the interventions of interest rather than resulting from a trend 
in the data. 
I use an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model to adjust 
for systematic noise (McDowall et al., 1980).  When the control variable for data 




Average with Exogenous Inputs).  As detailed in the next section, this variable 
measures the count of sources over time.     
First and foremost, I must identify the model’s structural parameters 
(p=autoregression, d=integration, and q=moving average).  The first parameter, p, 
refers to the number of prior observations used to estimate the current observation 
and addresses the correlation of the error terms (McDowall et al., 1980).  An ARIMA 
(1,0,0), also referred to as the first order autoregressive process, is demonstrated in 
Equation (1).   
,                                                      (1) 
Here, Φ1 is the correlation between the current and previous value of y (Dugan, 
2009).  With higher orders of the autoregressive process (p>1), previous lags have a 
direct relationship with the current value of y (Dugan, 2009).   
The second parameter, d, illustrates the process of differencing to create 
stationary models (no trend or drift), where random shocks have an expected value 
not different from zero.  As noted above and since my test for stationary yielded no 
unit root, my analyses will not be involved in the differencing procedure.   
The third parameter, q, denotes the number of moving average formations in 
the series and tackles the persistence of random shocks from one observation to the 
next.  An ARIMA (0,0,1), also known as the first order moving average process, is 
demonstrated in Equation (2).   
,                                                                                             (2) 
Here, yt is a product of both the current shock, εt, and the preceding shock εt-1     




demonstrated by the significance of the first correlation in the autocorrelation 
function.   
Once I estimate the parameters of the ARMAX model, I can examine the 
effect of interventions, through what McDowall and colleagues (1980) term an 
“impact assessment” in regards to the total, serious, and ideological-specific number 
of incidents.  An intervention component is added to this already specified noise 
model, allowing for three distinct effects to be adequately tested: abrupt and 
temporary, gradual and permanent, and abrupt and permanent.  It is possible that the 
legislation resulted in any of these outcomes.  For instance, the legislation could have 
deterred members of radical eco-groups immediately after it was enacted, but this 
effect may have been short-lived as extremists forget about the new legislation and 
associated penalties or decide motivations for participating in criminality outweighs 
that of any possible consequences.  Following the suggestions of McDowall and 
colleagues (1980), I first model interventions with this type of abrupt, temporary 
change.  McDowall et al. (1980) recommends starting here due to the implications 
that can be derived from the significance and magnitude of the slope.  Equation (3) 
represents this effect: 
Yt= δYt-1+ωIt + ε                    (3) 
The ωIt term represents the intervention component, where 1 indicates that the 
legislation has been enacted.  The δ term is used to symbolize the slope of the change 
as a result of the intervention and ε designates noise in the model.  Due to the fact that 




employ a sensitivity analysis testing the impact of a 1, 2, and 3 quarter effect, along 
with a 1, 2, and 417 month effect.   
It is also possible that the legislation took time to be publicized and that it 
forever changed the cost-benefit analyses of extremists and consequentially, the 
amount and kind of illegal activity perpetrated by them.  McDowall and colleagues 
(1980) assert that if the slopes (δ, when modeling the abrupt, temporary effects) are 
near one, then the effects are likely permanent.  Equation (4) represents this type of 
gradual, permanent effect with the same components as in Equation (3): 
Yt= δYt-1+ωIt++ ε                                                     (4) 
Finally, it could also be that the changes were indeed permanent, but that the impact 
was immediate rather than gradual.  In other words, members of radical eco-groups 
were affected soon after the legislation was enacted and remained affected.  This 
effect is indicated if the slopes are small and insignificant when modeling a gradual, 
permanent effect.  Equation 5 demonstrates this model with the removal of the slope 
component: 
Yt= ωIt++ ε                                                      (5)  
Dependent variables 
As noted, in my analysis I examine the outcomes of the aforementioned 
legislation on all criminal activity and in particular, serious activity measured through 
terrorist attacks and those involving damage.  I also examine the legislation in regards 
to environment-only and animal-only motivated attacks.  Therefore, the dependent 
variables for the interrupted time-series analysis are number of total attacks, number 
                                                




of terrorist attacks, number of attacks with damage, number of animal-only attacks, 
and number of environment-only attacks as aggregated to quarters (n=152) and 
months (n=456).  I used both levels of aggregation to see if there were differing 
effects based on how the data are measured.  Since all the dependent variables are 
highly skewed (given that terrorism is much less common that ordinary crime), I took 
the natural log of attacks over time after adding 1 to avoid taking the nonexistent log 
of 0.  This procedure normalized the data. 
 Independent variables 
The primary independent variables of the second research question regarding 
the impact of legislation are dummy variables, where 1= the presence of legislation 
and 0=its absence; here, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (date of November 18, 
1988), the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (date of August 26, 1992), and 
the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (date of November 27, 2006).  In the 
time-series analysis, I lagged these interventions by one quarter and one month to 
avoid simultaneity bias.  In other words, it is possible that the legislation was enacted 
in response to high criminal conduct, where any decrease in activity would be 
representative of a natural decline rather than the intervention effect. 
As demonstrated in Table 3.1, certain decades received more coverage than 
others (1970: 2 sources, 1980: 10 sources, 1990: 12 sources, and 2000: 12 sources).  
In order to reduce the possibility of biases, I include a control for number of data 
sources in the analyses.  This control variable will help guard against the possibility 
that the data have fewer cases in the 1970s not because there was less activity, but 




To address issues intrinsic to time-series analysis, series hazard models were 
developed as another tool to measure the role of government interventions on the time 
between events (Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree et al, 2009).  These models estimate the 
change in an incident’s hazard rate from event-specific and other date-specific 
variables (Dugan, 2009).  Equation (6) represents this type of model.  
€ 
h(Y ) = λ0 exp( 1β Interventions+ 2β DataSrc 3+β Context )                           (6) 
Therefore, the number of days until the next attempt (Y) is a function of an 
unspecified hazard baseline hazard function (λ0) and other independent variables 
(interventions, data source, and event context) measured at the time of the current 
attempt (Dugan et al., 2005).  In other words, I estimate the effectiveness of 
legislation on lowering the hazard of another attack, after controlling for other factors 
that would influence this same hazard.   
Using two different methods will reveal results that are robust across 
estimation strategies.  As Dugan (2009) explains, there are several issues with 
applying time-series models to event data.  The author cites the balance between 
statistical power and stability created through the length of the series and whether the 
data are organized by year, quarter, month, or week.  For instance, if I arrange the 
1056 incidents by week to gain statistical power, in turn I create an unstable model 
characterized by sparse events.  However, if I arrange the data by year I can limit this 
sparseness, but then have a problem with statistical power.  Analysts attempt to pick 
the unit that is a compromise between these two issues, which limits but does not 
eliminate their impact.  As discussed, I choose to examine the data on both a monthly 




Dugan (2009) also describes issues that arise from the aggregation of the data, 
particularly the potential masking of important distinctions and the treatment of all 
events in a time unit as the same.  This can be a problem, the author argues, when 
characteristics of one event influence another incident.  Theoretically, this could be an 
issue with the EID.  For example, it is possible that the highly publicized harassment 
of Stephen’s, Inc.’s employees and their subsequent selling of Huntingdon Life 
Science stock had an impact on other extremists; perhaps this successful incident led 
to more events?  However, an unsuccessful bombing of an animal research facility 
may have had the opposite effect.  The problem lies in the fact that time-series 
analysis treats these events as the same and ignores, “context specific 
dependence…accounting only for temporal dependence” (Dugan, 2009:5).   
Finally, Dugan (2009) contends that time-series analysis can lose variation in 
the timing of events during a particular span.  In fact, “imposing this artificial 
structure” can lead to, “bias when we ignore the relative timing of events to an 
intervention within the span” (p. 5).  It is likely that there is some clumping of 
incidents in the EID within a given time period as in a series of Earth Day protests 
that become criminal; a temporal distribution that is treated the same as those that are 
evenly disbursed.  There is also an issue with short-lived intervention effects as could 
be the case with some of the more high-profile legislation.  In fact, in lagging the 
intervention to avoid simultaneity bias, I can miss an effect that only lasted a couple 
of weeks.  All in all, the aforementioned limitations of time-series analysis can be 




time between activities instead of artificially aggregating the activities to multiple 
time periods” (Dugan, 2009:7).   
  Dependent variables 
The dependent variables for the series hazard modeling are days until next 
attack (average of 14 days), next terrorist attack (average of 23 days), next attack 
involving damage (average of 19 days), next environmental attack (average of 25 
days), and next animal-rights attack (54 days).   
Because the time between events is the dependent variable, more than one 
event can have the same value for its dependent variable.  This is referred to as tied 
data.  Since the events really did not occur at the exact same time, I need to estimate 
the ordering of them.  I employ the exact marginal method in my analysis that 
accounts for all possible orderings.   
Another issue occurs when automatically coding the dependent variable as the 
time until the next event when the next event is on the same day.  This produces zero 
days between events, when it should really be the time until the next unique day.  
Therefore, I recode time in these situations to be the days after the current day until 
the next incident for all events that occur on the same day.  Therefore, if there are 2 
attacks on February 3rd and the next attack occurs February 7th, those first 2 attacks 
will both reflect a time of four days. 
 Independent variables 
For the series hazard model, I measure the intervention for one year and 
conduct sensitivity analyses with two different end dates to see if this changes the 




to see if the interventions have a shorter-lived or more extensive impact than that of 
12 months.  In both analyses, I include a count of the number of data sources 
available over time.  As noted in the data section, I was able to locate more secondary 
sources for the more recent years covered in the data set so it is important to include a 
count of how many sources I have for a given day.  The average number of data 
sources in the EID was 9. 
Following Dugan and colleagues (2005) and LaFree et al. (2009), I also 
incorporate independent variables measuring last incident attempt (number of days 
since the last incident), success density18 (proportion of current and two previous 
incidents that were successful over the number of months spanning the three events), 
along with monthly count (controls for any trend in the overall hazard of events over 
time) in the series hazard model.  It is probable that successful events that occur close 
together would increase the law enforcement response, possibly decreasing the hazard 
of another event (Dugan, 2009).   The average days since the last incident are 14 for 
total, 25 for terrorist, 20 for damage, 26 for animal-only, and 53 for environment-
only.  On the other hand, a number of successful events may increase the hazard of 
more attacks when others notice that success.  The average success density for total 
incidents is 80, 65 for terrorist incidents, and 69 for damage incidents.  The success 
density for environment-only incidents was around 54, with animal-only events at 47.   
I also include a measure to indicate an animal rights ideology with the first 
three outcomes (total, terrorist, and damage incidents); attacks perpetrated by 
members of these groups may be more theatrical and publicized than their 
                                                
18 As with Dugan et al. (2005), I will also measure success density at 3 incidents as to keep the largest 
amount of observations and because it makes the most theoretical sense that recent success would be 




environmentally motivated counterparts and consequently, could differentially affect 
the hazard of another attack.  For example, ALF has been responsible for high profile 
incidents like monkey releases from medical research centers.  Attacks with an 
animal rights ideology represented 27% of all attacks and 29% of terrorist and 31% of 
damage incidents respectively.  
Also with the series hazard analysis, I test for interactions with a temporal 
count as in Dugan (2009).  By including an interaction of the intervention coupled 
with a monthly count variable, I can determine whether the slope of each intervention 
differs from the overall trend.  In other words, the interaction allows for a break in the 
trend. 
Question 3: Are members of radical environmental and animal rights groups 
deterred by an increase in costs as measured by high profile terrorist attacks? 
 
I also explore the role of context in deterring the criminal conduct of members 
of radical environmental and animal rights groups.  In other words, it is a possibility 
that environmental and animal rights extremists act not solely based on consideration 
of formal sanctions, but are also influenced by the occurrence of high profile, perhaps 
deadly, terrorist attacks.  For example, it could be the case that major U.S. terrorist 
events have changed the context in the same way as the Luxor and Orly incidents did 
in the societies in which they occurred by increasing the costs of being associated 
with these acts.  As Eidelson and McCauley (2009) have established, this appears to 
be the case with the Oklahoma City bombing in regards to right-wing ideologies.  I 
investigate the possible influence of two important attacks specifically related to the 




the Kitchen assassination.  As previously noted, the former attack resulted in a public 
outcry against tree-spiking, along with a larger movement towards nonviolence led by 
Judi Bari in partnership with loggers.  The latter event received a great deal of 
publicity and is associated with the only fatal attack suspected to be committed by a 
member of a radical eco-group in the United States.  The number of death threats 
received prior to this assassination (to kill one dean per month for 12 months) makes 
it a pivotal turning point in the movement and one that should be examined after such 
a threat was carried out.   
Both of these events represent important incidents where the context likely 
changed in response to the harm associated with them; they were events that may 
have increased the perceived costs of this type of illegal activity.  As with the first 
research question, I start by exploring the role that these events had in decreasing all 
incidents as spillover effects are possible; in other words, a changing context may 
affect all activity perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights 
groups.  I then test for the events’ impact on serious incidents (considered terrorism 
or involving damage) to see if the activity at the more destructive end of the spectrum 
was affected.  Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H3a: High profile terrorist attacks will decrease the number of total incidents 
and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated by members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups. 
H3b: High profile terrorist attacks will decrease the number of terrorist and 
damage incidents and the hazard of a new terrorist and damage incident 
perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups. 
 
Once again, and although spillover effects are a possibility, the incidents should have 
the most influence on the behaviors related to their specific movement.  Thus, the 




attacks, especially tree-spiking.  The Kitchen assassination should influence animal 
rights attacks more than other incidents.  There is also again the possibility of 
substitution effects; perhaps the Alexander tree-spiking decreased environmental 
events, but increased animal rights incidents.  Therefore, my secondary hypotheses 
are: 
H3c: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for the environment 
will decrease following the Alexander tree-spiking. 
H3d: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for animal rights will 
decrease following the Kitchen assassination. 
 
Analyses 
My evaluation of these variables also involves interrupted time-series and 
series hazard modeling.  As with the legal sanctions, it is theoretically possible that 
the Alexander tree-spiking and the Kitchen assassination had an immediate impact or 
that it took time for the context to change in response to these events.  It is also 
possible that the impact was either short-lived or permanent; it is best to test for all 
three effects within the data.  Once again, I conduct a sensitivity analysis where a 
temporary effect is measured through 1, 2, and 3 quarters and 1, 2, and 4 months.  
The interaction terms in my series hazard analysis will help me to tease out the 
possibility of different effects.   
Independent variables 
 The independent variables for the second quantitative analysis will be the 




February 8, 1990).  Once again, I created dummy variables, where time before the 
incident = 0 and time after the incident =1.   
In the series hazard model, I measure the intervention for one year and 
conduct sensitivity analyses to determine whether two different end dates matter.  I 
include a count variable measuring the number of data sources over time in both 
analyses.  For the series hazard model, I once again incorporate independent variables 
measuring last incident attempt, success density, monthly count, an animal rights 
ideology (for the first three outcomes), and interactions with monthly count.  I also 
examine the events with the legislation to see if the results vary with their inclusion. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I documented both the qualitative and quantitative data 
collection process, identified the three related research questions with their associated 
hypotheses, described both the time-series and series hazard modeling involved in 
testing these questions, and illustrated how I measure the variables of interest.  In the 
next chapter, I present the findings from the first research question, which seeks to 
gauge how appropriate the rational choice framework is in explaining the criminal 




Chapter 4: Interview Results 
In this chapter, I explore the results of the qualitative data in order to discern if 
and how the rational framework fits into the decision-making of those that ascribe to 
an environmental and/or animal rights ideology.  It is important to establish that 
activists weigh costs and benefits and act toward expected utility before I 
quantitatively evaluate macro-level interventions contingent on these assumptions.  
More specifically, I seek to answer: Are those who are motivated by an environmental 
and/or animal rights ideology sensitive to considerations of legal sanctions and 
moral evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses?  As previously noted, I expect 
considerations of both legal sanctions and moral evaluations to be important to 
activist decision-making.  I hypothesized that those who are motivated by an 
environmental and/or animal rights ideology are sensitive to considerations of both 
legal sanctions and moral evaluations when contemplating illegal behavior.  All in all, 
I discovered support for this hypothesis in my interviews. 
Legal Sanctions 
Many of the activists in my sample described legal sanctions as very 
important to their decision-making.  When asked about whether they would 
participate in different scenarios with legal consequences, several activists said that 
they would refrain from such behavior.  In the case of a great deal of my participants, 
being arrested was a cost that outweighed any benefits achieved from illegal conduct 
(i.e. an ecosystem is not developed (benefit) because someone pours sugar in the gas 




I value my freedom too much.  I am concerned about legal sanctions 
(Participant 008). 
 
I’m sure that’s affected me in a lot of ways.  I’m not sure that piece of 
legislation, but laws (Participant 013). 
 
In fact, certain activists talked about avoiding those who would risk incarceration to 
get a point across. 
If someone is radical we like to distance ourselves from that.  (Organization 
withheld) members wear going to jail as a badge of honor.  But none of us 
want to go to jail (Participant 001). 
 
Many participants also spoke to legal sanctions in the context of how it would affect 
their future.  In other words, it was not just getting arrested or going to jail that was a 
deterrent, but rather the future implications of having a record that were costs that 
once again, outweighed any benefits to illegal activity.  These consequences were part 
of an expected utility framework; that is, activists believed that having a record would 
be a barrier to future opportunities and thus, acted accordingly.  
It just never has been an option for me (getting arrested).  It would produce an 
inability for me to get a job…affect things further down the line.  I don’t like 
fur, but I’m never going to chain myself to a fur companies’ door (Participant 
001).   
 
(Acts of vandalism) would probably be on your record and I would be in 
trouble with my parents. You might not be able to get certain types of jobs if 
they saw that you were arrested (Participant 003). 
 
I just don’t want to protest and risk arrest, because that may mean risking 
medical school.  I have to take my future into consideration (Participant 006). 
 
The only reason I would really be scared of an action against me would be 
that it might prevent me from things later in life like applying to a job  
(Participant 011). 
 
The activists in my sample often said that there were other legitimate avenues to 




choice perspective, the benefits of noncriminal activity outweighed its criminal 
counterpart in many situations; even those situations that seemed hopeless or at times, 
insensitive to legal dissent. 
Lobbying makes an impression and our leaders realize that issues might not 
affect us now, but in the future.  In law we can counter.  Ultimately, the voice 
and education of the youth can change minds (Participant 006). 
 
Sometimes it (lobbying, petitioning) feels ineffective, but we have to do it. It 
will help make things better now.  It is successful when you talk to people in a 
respectful, knowledgeable way and present them with what you know and feel 
about over an issue (Participant 008). 
 
I do not believe in bombing everybody.  I do not believe in going out and 
doing all of these really radical, violent things.  We get little bits and pieces of 
what we want (from lobbying) it is the most effective (activity) that I 
participate in (Participant 012). 
 
Interestingly, some activists said that they would not do anything illegal themselves, 
but in a way, admired those that did: 
Sometimes I think that what they are doing (radical animal rights groups) is 
sort of good; they throw paint on ships and do other things to try to get the 
whales to go away. As long as they aren’t doing anything to harm or 
(anything) super illegal then I guess they are okay (Participant 003). 
 
And to me, I almost commend the activists because they’re standing up for 
what they believe in, even though it’s criminal.  Maybe that goes against what 
I said earlier, but they are standing up for what they believe in (Participant 
015).  
 
All in all, it would appear that legal sanctions are very important to the cost-benefit 
analysis of environmental and animal rights activists.  To most of my participants, 
laws were an important consideration in whether they would engage in certain 
behaviors.  Both sanctions from such laws and the expected penalties associated with 
them (especially regarding employment) were costs that outweighed any benefits of 




future in a negative way and consequently were deterred; this belief highlighted a sort 
of expected utility in activist decision-making.  Participants also spoke to the benefits 
that could be achieved from noncriminal avenues; lobbying was often cited as an 
effective way to get problems solved.     
Many activists also verbalized similar themes to that described in the work of 
Wheatley and McCauley (2008) and Dugan et al. (2008).  In other words, that a major 
criminal act, and especially a major terrorist act, would delegitimize the cause and be 
counterproductive to its goals.  From a rational choice perspective, being associated 
with highly destructive or violent acts was a cost that far outweighed any benefit 
achieved from illegal conduct. 
They (radical groups) are trying to sell that message to all these people and in 
the process they are using things like scare tactics and I just think that that has 
had a negative impact on public opinion (Participant 004). 
 
I remember when I started organizing this, a lot of students were like ‘We 
should camp out there, we should build a tree house, we should get a lot of 
people, we should raise hell.’  And we had to step back and be like I don’t 
think that is going to work.  I think that is going to embarrass us and we could 
actually be penalized for that and I think we would take the risk of looking 
stupid and not looking strategic, not like we thought this out (Participant 004).  
 
Violence is too extreme; it really does threaten any hope to have a trustful 
relationship and to come to a common ground on something (Participant 005). 
 
Threatening someone is not going to make them more conscious.  It is going 
to make it appear like you are crazy (Participant 006). 
 
We are not going to work against the cause; it is not strategic (Participant 
007). 
 
I feel like it (force) discredits the movement as a whole.  I believe that in order 
to be effective there has to be education and diplomacy (Participant 009).  
 
I don’t know that frustrating people has every gotten anyone anywhere. I 
don’t think that burning down a building makes a point other than that you are 





I haven’t really gotten much of a feel of how environmental terrorism has 
really helped the cause. It just seems like they have been hurting the cause by 
garnering negative media attention to the movement (Participant 011). 
 
So by being violent to solve violence, it’s only going to give a bad impression 
(Participant 015). 
 
In addition to this lost sense of legitimacy, almost every activist described an internal 
moral compass of sorts as guiding their decision-making.  From the rational choice 
framework, the moral evaluation of an act was as important, and sometimes more 
important, than possible legal sanctions.  In other words, moral inhibitions both 
conditioned and were independent of a cost-benefit analysis as in Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996).  
I guess I’m saying that it’s the fact that it (illegal activity) goes against my 
values…that’s the big thing (Participant 002). 
 
It is morally wrong to exert excessive force or harm to make a point.  You 
have to try to make others understand, but leave and move on when you meet 
people who don’t get it (Participant 006). 
 
There is a moral boundary that I…that tells me what is going too far and what 
is not going too far.  I’m just pre-destined to participate in behavior that is 
legal and morally right (Participant 011). 
 
Several participants also described illegal behavior, especially forceful and violent 
behavior, as being hypocritical when juxtaposed to their overall message of valuing 
human life. 
99.9% of people in the groups are pacifists or hippies…or are into the 
metaphysical, mind-body-spirit thing…and have jobs where they are working 
for something they believe in (Participant 001).    
 
Animal rights is such a fundamentally nonviolent movement or it should 
be…the thing is it is all based on you don’t need to be violent towards other 
creatures and if you don’t need to be then it’s wrong as far as I am concerned.  





I would never get violent.  I would never push someone.  I don’t want to hurt 
anyone in the process.  Like hateful letters are hurtful.  You have to practice 
what you preach (Participant 004). 
 
We believe in principles of nonviolence; in nonviolent direct action.  We 
follow the teachings of Martin Luther King. We can prevent something from 
happening.  We also follow Quaker principles of bearing witness and passive 
resistance.  You have to be there in the zone of exposure and insist on being 
involved (Participant 007).  
 
I believe in nonviolent action.  We should be peaceful and be guided by our 
ethics (Participant 008). 
 
As a whole, the environmental and animal rights activists in my sample are rational 
decision-makers who are guided by moral inhibitions.  To some participants, these 
inhibitions were more important than possible legal consequences, while others had 
difficulty ranking one above the other and argued for the importance of both in 
decision-making.  Many also spoke to the theme that illegal activity would harm the 
legitimacy of the cause by being an immoral alternative.  However, it should be noted 
that this sample is not necessarily representative of the more radical contingent of 
these groups; so while activists in my sample consider legal sanctions and morality, I 
cannot assume that those on the terrorist end of the spectrum do as well.  
In summary, consistent with my first hypothesis, those who are motivated by 
an environmental and/or animal rights ideology express opinions that are generally 
consistent with a model of rational actors who consider both legal sanctions and 
moral evaluations when contemplating illegal behavior.  In the next chapter, I 
quantitatively evaluate the impact of several key legal sanctions on combating total 
criminal activity, serious criminal activity, and ideology-specific criminal activity 




Chapter 5: Legal Sanction Results 
 
In this chapter, I report the results of the second research question, How 
effective has recent U.S. federal legislation been in decreasing the criminal activities 
of radical environmental and animal rights groups?  First, I display the descriptive 
trends over time in respect to the legal interventions.  Next, I present the findings 
from the time-series models.  Finally, I discuss the series hazard models.  These 
analyses will help me to discern whether the following four hypotheses are validated: 
H2a: U.S. federal sentencing legislation will decrease the number of total 
incidents and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated by members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups. 
H2b: U.S. federal sentencing legislation will decrease the number of terrorist 
and damage incidents and the hazard of a new terrorist and damage incident 
perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups. 
H2c: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for the environment 
will decrease following the implementation of ADA. 
H2d: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for animal rights will 
decrease following the implementation of AEPA and AETA. 
Trends over Time 
Figures 5.1.-5.4 demonstrate the yearly trends of all incidents (n=1056), 
terrorist incidents (n=622), incidents involving property damage (n=731), and 
incidents disaggregated by ideology (animal-only incidents (n=491)), and 
environment-only incidents (n=288)), along with the legal interventions of interest.  
Figure 5.1 shows a peak of 159 incidents in 2001, with a steady decrease thereafter.  
In fact, total incidents decreased 82% from 2001 to 2007.  Terrorist attacks and 
attacks involving damage exhibit similar trends and peaks to that of total incidents.  
Figure 5.2 also shows a peak in 2001 with 93 terrorist incidents and a decrease of 




incidents involving damage and a 77% decrease to the end of the trend.  When 
disaggregated by ideology as shown in Figure 5.4, the environment-only incidents 
best mirror these trends, especially in regards to the major peak of incidents in 2001 
at 79 incidents.  For animal-only incidents, there are several peaks at 45 events in 
addition to 2001 including the years 2003 and 2005. 
All five figures exhibit the fewest number of incidents in the early 1970s.  
This may be because the highly active group of SHAC was not even formed until 
1998, and the more prominent groups like ELF and ALF have birth dates of anywhere 
from the mid-70s to the late-80s depending upon the source.  I do need to keep in 
mind the possibility that these low numbers are due to the lighter coverage of the 
1970s and thus will control for it in the analyses. 
 In 1988, the year of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, there were 29 total, 17 terrorist, 
22 damage, 10 animal-only, and 4 environment-only incidents.  The following year 
yielded 40 total, 25 terrorist, 28 damage, 13 animal-only, and 8 environment-only 
events.  In 1992, the year that the Animal Enterprise Protection Act was enacted, 
members of radical environmental and animal rights groups committed 11 total, 6 
terrorist and damage, 3 animal-only, and 4 environment-only incidents.  1993 saw an 
increase of 18, 9, 14, 13, and 2 total, terrorist, damage, animal-only, and 
environment-only events respectively.  In 2006, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
became law; the same year that 28 total, 15 terrorist, 19 damage, 13 animal-only, and 
5 environment-only acts were committed.  The next year witnessed an increase of 
only 1 total and terrorist incident, but also 7 damage, 4 animal-only incidents and a 




All in all, these overall short-term increases following the legislation do not 
support the idea that there was a deterrent effect.  However, in the next section I 
conduct a more formal test of the possibility that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism 
Act of 2006 deterred all illegal, terrorist, damage, animal-only, and environment-only 
activity perpetrated by radical eco-groups. 
Time-Series Results 
 As previously noted, I first modeled abrupt, temporary effects based on the 
suggestions of McDowall and colleagues (1980).  Once again, and due to the arbitrary 
nature of determining what constitutes a temporary impact, I tested for a 1, 2, and 3 
quarter effect, along with a 1, 2, and 4 month effect.  After reviewing the slopes of 
my various models, I determined that only AEPA’s impact on monthly animal-only 
incidents indicated an abrupt, temporary effect for 2 months.  The remainder of 
combinations had slopes that were positive, near 1, and significant, and consequently 
signified permanent effects for my interventions of interest.  After modeling gradual, 
permanent effects, two slopes were small and insignificant and therefore suggested 
abrupt, permanent effects; the Anti-Drug Abuse Act on monthly terrorist and on 
animal-only attacks. 
Tables 5.1-5.5 demonstrate the quarterly results of the ARMAX (1,0,1) 
modeling of all incidents, terrorist incidents, damage, animal-only, and environment-
only incidents without interventions (Model 1), with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 




with the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (Model 4)19.  In each table, Model 
1 represents the base model from which all other models are built as determined from 
examination of the ACF and PCF.  The autoregressive (AR) and the moving average 
(MA) reach statistical significance validating an ARIMAX (1,0,1) process.   
In regards to my first and second hypotheses regarding legislation, if the 
severe sanctions deterred activity as expected by increasing costs, the coefficients for 
total incidents and serious (terrorist and damage) should be negative and significant.  
However, I only find a significant effect in the quarterly results for one piece of 
legislation (Animal Enterprise Protection Act or AEPA) and it is in the opposite 
direction than predicted.  More precisely, AEPA is associated with a 13%20 increase 
in the number of damage incidents (Z=2.13, p<.05) beyond the initial white noise 
model.  The variable for number of data sources over time is also significant and 
positive throughout the models, rendering it an important control variable.  
The monthly results are similar with one main caveat as shown in Tables 5.6-
5.10.  As with the quarterly data, AEPA is associated with a 4% increase in the 
number of damage attacks (Z=2.28, p<.05).  However, AEPA is also related to a 3% 
increase in both total (Z=2.26, p<.05) and terrorist attacks (Z=2.02, p<.05).  Once 
again, the data source variable is also positive and significant in many of the models.   
As for my secondary hypotheses regarding the disaggregated outcomes by 
ideology, only the monthly results yield significant results.  Here, AEPA once again 
had a significant impact.  Specifically, AEPA increased (Z=1.96, p<.05) the number 
of environment-only attacks by 4%, but did not influence the number of animal-only 
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incidents.  ADA, on the other hand, was responsible for significantly (Z=2.76, p<.01) 
increasing the number of animal-only incidents by almost 68%.   
 All in all, these results are unsupportive of a deterrent effect.  It would appear 
that AEPA is associated with significant increases in illegal activity; however this 
effect differs by level of aggregation.  In addition, the legislation seems to be 
ineffective at controlling the behavior it was intended to and displacing it to other 
ideologies (ADA to animal-only and AEPA to environment-only).  Before I look 
further to the mechanisms for explaining AEPA’s and ADA’s effects, I now turn to a 
more robust analysis of the data.  The next section presents the results obtained from 
the series hazard models; a method unencumbered by level of aggregation (monthly 
or quarterly), with controls for the influence of one event on another.  
Series Hazard Results21 
 For the series hazard modeling, I estimate five separate models: (1) all 
incidents perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups, 
(2) only terrorist incidents, (3) only those involving damage, (4) animal-only 
incidents, and (5) environment-only incidents.  Table 5.11 displays these results.  As 
noted in Chapter 3, I tested for interaction effects composed of the intervention and a 
monthly count of incidents.  The only significant interaction was that of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act (ADA) for the first three outcomes.  This interaction suggests that 
ADA yielded around a 10% decrease in the hazard of another attack and serious 
(terrorist or involving damage attack) per month.  In addition to the ADA interaction, 
AEPA was once again significant, but only in the model with terrorist cases.  In fact, 
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AEPA is responsible for a 60% decrease in the hazard of another attack of this kind.  
Interestingly, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) decreases the hazard of 
another attack by 45% and another damage attack by 36%, but not another terrorist 
attack.  However, AETA did decrease the hazard of another animal-only attack by 
about 46% as expected given the target of the legislation.  In fact, this piece of 
legislation was the only one to have an ideologically specific effect of significance 
and thus support my secondary hypotheses.    
All of the control variables were significant in at least one of the models.  The 
number of data sources does significantly increase the hazard of all types of attacks. 
In addition, when the three most recent attacks are successful and clustered, the 
hazard of another incident increases significantly.  However, the measure for days 
since last incident is not a factor similar to Dugan et al.’s (2005) findings that 
contagion appears to function through successful events only.  The exception is 
animal-only attacks, where last incident is a marginally significant influence on the 
hazard of future attacks.  The significance (p<.05) of the animal rights motivation 
indicates that this particular ideology decreases the hazard of all attacks, but not 
terrorist or damage events.  Finally, the significant (p<.001) monthly count variable 
indicates an increasing trend in the hazard of all, terrorist, damage, animal-only, and 
environment-only attacks.   
Summary 
All in all, my results varied by method and by level of aggregation.  This 
complicates the answer to my first research question: How effective has recent U.S. 




and animal rights groups?  When I examine this question through time-series 
analysis, my results indicate an increase in illegal activity associated with the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act and the Animal Enterprise Protection Act.  However, these effects 
are primarily only marginally significant (p<.05) and affect the dependent variables 
differently depending on level of aggregation.  In other words, the quarterly results 
indicate AEPA significantly increases only the number of damage incidents, while the 
monthly results reveal an impact on four of the outcomes.  In addition, the monthly 
results also demonstrate ADA’s impact on animal-only incidents, perhaps suggesting 
displacement. 
The series hazard model results are more consistent with a deterrence 
framework and my hypotheses.  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act interaction term, the 
Animal Enterprise Protection Act, and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
significantly decrease the hazard of another attack, but the type of attack varies based 
on the legislation.  In other words, ADA decreases the hazard of another attack and 
serious attack, but AEPA only influences terrorist attacks, while AETA decreases the 
hazard of all, damage, and the behavior it was aimed at, animal-only incidents.  In the 
next section, I test for the possibility of another deterrence mechanism at work: that 






Chapter 6:  Terrorist Attack Results 
 In this chapter, I present the results of my third research question: Are 
members of radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred by an increase 
in costs as measured through high profile terrorist attacks?   I first describe the 
descriptive trends over time in relation to the Alexander tree-spiking and Kitchen 
assassination.  I then present the results from the time-series analysis.  Finally, I 
discuss the series hazard results.   These separate analyses will help me to discern the 
validity of the following four hypotheses: 
H3a: The high profile terrorist attacks will decrease the number of total 
incidents and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated by members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups. 
H3b: The high profile terrorist attacks will decrease the number of terrorist 
and damage incidents and the hazard of a new terrorist and damage incident 
perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights groups. 
H3c: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for the environment 
will decrease following the Alexander tree-spiking. 
H3d: Compared to acts committed in the name of other eco-ideologies, the 
number of and the hazard of a new incident perpetrated for animal rights will 
decrease following the Kitchen assassination. 
Trends over Time  
Figures 6.1-6.4 represent the yearly trends of all incidents (n=1056), terrorist 
incidents (n=622), incidents involving property damage (n=731), and incidents 
disaggregated by ideology (animal-only incidents (n=491)), and environment-only 
incidents (n=288)), along with the moral interventions of interest.  As noted in 
Chapter 5, the number of total incidents peaked with 159 in 2001 and decreased 
steadily thereafter; 82% from 2001 to 2007.  Also as previously discussed, terrorist 




incidents with the fewest number occurring in the early 1970s.  Environment-only 
incidents have similar trends, but once again, animal-only incidents have more peaks 
than solely that of 2001.   
In 1987, the year of the Alexander tree-spiking, there were 23 total, 17 
terrorist, 19 damage, 8 animal-only, and 10 environment-only incidents.  As noted, 
the following year yielded 29 total, 17 terrorist, 22 damage, 10 animal-only, and 4 
environment-only events.  In 1990, the year of the Kitchen assassination, members of 
radical environmental and animal rights groups committed 24 total, 18 terrorist, 11 
damage, 4 animal-only, and 7 environment-only incidents.  1991 saw a change to 15 
total, 10 terrorist, 8 animal-only, and 2 environment-only events respectively with no 
change in damage incidents.   
From these descriptive patterns, I would expect to see a deterrent effect 
resulting from the Kitchen assassination, but not more pronounced among animal-
only incidents as I hypothesized.  On the other hand, the Alexander tree-spiking 
seemed to increase total activity, but appeared to decrease environment-only 
incidents.  However, in the next section I conduct a more formal test of the possibility 
that these events deterred all illegal, terrorist, damage, animal-only, and environment-
only activity perpetrated by members of radical eco-groups. 
Time-Series Results 
As in Chapter 4, I first modeled interventions with an abrupt, temporary 
change.  I once again tested for a 1, 2, and 3 quarter effect, along with a 1, 2, and 4 




determine that all were near 1 and significant, and consequently indicated gradual, 
permanent effects for my interventions of interest.   
 Tables 6.1-6.5 demonstrate the quarterly results of the ARMAX (1,0,1) 
modeling of all incidents, terrorist incidents, damage incidents, animal-only incidents, 
and environment-only without interventions (Model 1), with the Alexander tree-
spiking (Model 2), and with the Kitchen assassination (Model 3)22.  In each table, 
Model 1 represents the base model from which all other models are built upon as 
determined from investigation of the ACF and PCF.  The autoregressive (AR) and the 
moving average (MA) reach statistical significance, once again validating an ARIMA 
(1,0,1) process.   
If these important events changed the moral environment and thus deterred 
activity, the coefficients should be negative and significant as hypothesized.  While I 
do find a significant effect for the Alexander tree-spiking, it is in a direction opposite 
of the one I hypothesized, and only for one outcome.  Specifically, the Alexander 
tree-spiking is associated with a 7% increase in the number of damage incidents 
beyond the initial white noise model.   
The monthly results are depicted in Tables 6.6-6.10.  Once again, an 
ARIMAX (1,0,1) was specified for the base model with both the autoregressive (AR) 
and moving average (MA) components significant further corroborating this process.  
However, neither of the terrorist events is significant in the monthly models 
suggesting that these events did not impact the number of total incidents, serious 
incidents, or ideologically-specific incidents.   
                                                





Series Hazard Results23 
For the series hazard modeling, I once again estimate five separate models: (1) 
all incidents perpetrated by members of radical environmental and animal rights 
groups, (2) only terrorist incidents, (3) only those involving damage, (4) animal-only, 
and (5) environment-only.  Table 6.11 presents the results.  Once again, neither 
terrorist event had an impact, even throughout all five outcomes. 
 The control variables behaved similarly in this model to that of the model in 
Chapter 5.  Once again, the number of data sources, success density, and monthly 
count significantly increased the hazard of another attack.  Also, the number of days 
since the last attack only had an impact on ideologically-specific outcomes.  Here an 
animal rights ideology decreases the hazard of just damage attacks.   
To examine whether these results held up with all five interventions in the 
same model at the same time, I next analyzed the full model for all five outcomes.  
Table 6.12 shows these findings.  As in the models without the legal interventions, 
neither terrorist event has an impact on the five outcomes of interest.  Also similar to 
the prior model, all significant effects found in the legal-only model remain with the 
terrorist attacks.  The control variables also behave similarly to previous analyses.   
Summary 
Unlike the investigation into legal interventions, I only found one significant 
effect of the high profile attacks from two separate methodologies.  In addition, this 
effect, the Alexander tree-spiking on quarterly damage incidents, is in the opposite 
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direct as hypothesized.  It would appear that the simple answer to my third research 
question, Are members of radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred 
by an increase in costs as measured through high profile terrorist attacks, is no.  
Overall, my hypotheses based on this question were unsupported in the analyses.  It 
appears that these particular events, although well-publicized and representative of a 
changing environment, did not have an impact on total incidents, serious incidents, or 






Chapter 7:  Discussion and Conclusions 
The difference between tying yourself to a tree and pouring sugar in a (gas) 
tank is that you can get arrested for one of them. At that point I still wouldn’t 
do it. I would see it as lowering myself and there is a moral standard that you 
adhere to and if I knew that I fought for it…I probably wouldn’t go that far 
(Participant 010).  
 
 
The literature on radical environmental and animal rights groups has primarily 
lacked empirical data, theoretical models, and statistical tests.  Much of this literature 
has focused on the debate surrounding terminology (Vanderheiden, 2005; 2008; 
Amster, 2006) or on declarations over the amount of threat posed by these groups 
without robust quantitative findings to support such claims (Eagan, 1996; Liddick, 
2006).  Although prior work has applied a handful of criminological theories to the 
activities of these groups (Liddick, 2006; Smith et al., 2009), the research has ignored 
the most relevant of perspectives; that of rational choice and specifically, deterrence 
theory.  Similarly, while there is some descriptive accounts of the illegal activity 
perpetrated by radical eco-groups (Department of Homeland Security, 2008), there 
had been no independent and systematic data collection effort or sophisticated 
statistical analysis of such activity.    
As a whole, objective deterrence research has been largely unsupportive of the 
role of severe punishments in deterring crime (Tittle, 1969; Kovandvic et al., 2004).  
Perceptual research on deterrence has exhibited similar themes, where one’s 
perception of a certain punishment is a much stronger predictor of intended activity 
(Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen et al. 1978).  One important development from 




explain why some people are deterred and others are not (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; 
Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003).  One such characteristic, 
moral inhibitions, has explained differences in sexual assault and white collar 
offending (Bachman et al., 1992; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996).  While there has 
been some examination of objective measures of deterrence (Lum et al., 2006), there 
has been no investigation into perceptions, and especially morality in defining those 
perceptions, in the terrorism literature.  One of the most recent advances in this 
literature, proposed by Bouhana and Wikstrom (2008), has yet to be quantitatively 
analyzed.  However, the ideas set forth in these researchers’ conceptualization of the 
moral environment ties in with the findings of Wheatley and McCauley (2008) and 
others.  In other words, certain catastrophic terrorist events can change the perception 
of terrorism as a tactic.  To date, no investigation has tied these theoretical 
components into one cohesive argument, nor applied them to the criminal conduct of 
members of radical environmental and animal rights groups.   
 While there are some rough estimates of the number of attacks or the amount 
of damage caused by environmental and animal rights extremists, there has been a 
lack of independent and systematic collections of these events.  Furthermore, the 
analysis that does exist is primarily descriptive in nature (Liddick, 2006; Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008) or outside the scope of this investigation due to its focus 
on pre-incident conduct (Smith et al., 2009).  Limited quantitative research has been 
devoted to assessing the severity of the threat posed by radical eco-groups.  A review 




countermeasures enacted to deal with this threat; information that can be garnered 
from robust quantitative analyses. 
Summary of Research Findings 
This dissertation contributes to both the rational choice and terrorism 
literatures by addressing the aforementioned conceptual and methodological deficits.  
I examined whether legal sanctions, morality, both, or neither deters members of 
radical environmental and animal rights groups.  I argued for the importance of a 
rational choice framework, specifically one that considers severe punishments, the 
moral evaluation of an act, and the environment in which such an evaluation is made.  
More specifically, I explored three primary research questions: (1) Are those who are 
motivated by an environmental and/or animal rights ideology sensitive to 
considerations of legal sanctions and moral evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses, 
(2) How effective has recent U.S. federal legislation been in decreasing the criminal 
activities of radical environmental and animal rights groups and, (3) Are members of 
radical environmental and animal rights groups deterred by an increase in costs as 
measured through high profile terrorist attacks? 
To address the first of these questions and its related hypothesis, I explored a 
series of 25 interviews conducted with environmental and animal rights activists from 
a large, northeastern city.  Most of the activists were young (between 18-25), 
Caucasian, and educated, but balanced in regards to environmental and animal rights 
motivations and gender.  From these interviews, I was able to examine how sensitive 




To answer the second and third research questions, I developed and analyzed 
a database of criminal conduct committed by environmental and animal rights 
extremists from 1970 to 2007.  This database, known as the EID, is the most 
extensive collection of the illegal conduct perpetrated by members of radical eco-
groups in the United States that has been collected by an independent investigator.  In 
my collection of incidents, I utilized several open sources including the Global 
Terrorism Database and Foundation for Biomedical Research chronology.  In all, I 
collected a total of 1056 unique U.S. incidents committed by members of radical eco-
groups from the years 1970 through 2007.  From the descriptive statistics of the data, 
I was able to conclude that while members of these groups are often involved in 
conduct that can be considered highly destructive and as fitting the GTD’s definition 
of terrorism, few of the attacks involve physical violence or the threat of such 
violence.   
As for my first research question, Are those who are motivated by an 
environmental and/or animal rights ideology sensitive to considerations of legal 
sanctions and moral evaluations in their cost-benefit analyses, my findings were 
consistent with my hypothesis.  Many interview participants discussed the 
consideration of legal sanctions, and especially the possible ramifications from these 
sanctions, when explaining their individual-level decision-making.  They also 
communicated the importance of gaining benefits from noncriminal avenues, such as 
lobbying.  In addition, many participants referred to the role that illegal conduct, and 
especially terrorist conduct has on decreasing the legitimacy of the environmental 




support in my sample; most participants argued that illegal activity was, to them, 
morally wrong.  Thus, to my sample, criminal and especially terrorist activity was 
often perceived as an immoral alternative.  In some cases, the moral evaluations of an 
act were more important than its potential legal consequences, but many responses 
indicated themes of consistent with both conceptualization.   
In regards to my second research question, How effective has recent U.S. 
federal legislation been in decreasing the criminal activities of radical environmental 
and animal rights groups, my results depended upon the method employed.  My 
time-series analysis indicates that the Animal Enterprise Protection Act is associated 
with a gradual and permanent increase in the amount of criminal conduct committed 
by environmental and animal rights extremists.  However, these effects are only 
marginally significant (p<.05) and differ in the quarterly and monthly analyses.  In 
other words, AEPA was associated with a significant increase in the number of 
damage incidents when the data are aggregated by quarter, while the monthly results 
demonstrate an impact on four of the outcomes including environment-only attacks.  
The monthly results also show that ADA increases the number of animal-only 
incidents; a finding that does not show up in the quarterly analysis. 
The series hazard model results are more consistent with my hypotheses and 
with a deterrence framework.  All three pieces of legislation significantly decreased 
the hazard of another attack, but the type of attack varied based on the legislation.  
Namely, ADA decreased the hazard of total attacks and serious attacks (terrorist and 




decreased the hazard of both all, damage, and animal-only incidents.  These findings 
are consistent with the full model outcomes.   
The large difference in my findings based on method could be the result of 
one of two mechanisms at work; the first of which ties back to my discussion of time-
series analysis and its weaknesses.  My ARMAX models were sensitive to the level 
of aggregation, especially given the relatively small number of incidents spread over 
152 quarters and 456 months.  In addition, aggregation could have masked important 
distinctions, since time-series only deals with temporal and not contextual 
dependence of incidents.  Finally, it is also possible that my ARMAX models treated 
all events within a quarter or month as the same when there was likely clustering of 
incidents.  For instance, incidents could be linked like in the case of radical Earth Day 
protests, which all occur on the same day in different cities throughout the country.  If 
the intervention is lagged to avoid simultaneity as I did, time-series analysis can also 
miss short-lived effects.  Although ARIMA is sensitive to these limitations, it was 
important to undergo both methods due to the fact that (1) it measures a separate 
outcome that that of series hazard modeling, and (2) prior to this investigation, the 
conceptual conclusions have remained the same in the handful of studies using both 
methods.   
Another possible explanation for the differences between my two modeling 
strategies is that the analyses are really measuring two separate outcomes.  Time-
series looks at the frequency of incidents as the dependent variable, while series 
hazard examines the time between incidents.  Therefore, it is possible that certain 




them.  This explanation for the differences certainly convolutes any implications we 
can draw, particularly those that are policy-orientated. 
My third and final research question of interest, Are members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups deterred by an increase in costs as measured 
through high profile terrorist attacks, had more straight-forward results.  In both the 
quarterly and monthly time-series results, the Alexander tree-spiking and the Kitchen 
assassination did not have a significant influence on the number of total, terrorist, or 
ideologically specific events.  However, the former event did significantly increase 
the number of damage incidents.  The series hazard models yielded no significant 
effects for either terrorist attack.  Although these events were well-publicized and 
consequentially forced groups to redefine the appropriateness of certain tactics (i.e. 
the public renunciation against tree-spiking), they did not do enough to significantly 
impact behavior.  Perhaps these events did not change the environment as 
hypothesized because the perceived benefits of criminal activity continued to 
outweigh the costs, even in increasingly intolerant surroundings. 
All in all, I conclude that while the qualitative data indicates activists are 
sensitive to the costs associated with legal sanctions and the moral evaluations of a 
given act, their criminal behavior has not been significantly deterred by macro-level 
terrorist events.  This is perhaps a result of the benefits of criminal activity 
outweighing the costs measured through a general distaste for such behavior.  The 
answer to my second research question is considerably more complicated.  The legal 
interventions appear to increase the frequency of incidents, but decrease the hazard on 




inherent to time-series data or simply due to the fact that these methods are measuring 
disparate outcomes.  I tend to lean toward the former mechanism for explaining the 
discrepancy.  In other words, the more robust analysis indicates that the legal 
interventions decreased illegal activity as theoretically expected.  
Discussion 
 This study has important conceptual and methodological implications.  In 
regards to the former, environmental and animal rights activists often operate from 
within a rational choice framework.  In other words, activists in my sample utilized a 
cost-benefit analysis, with crime occurring when the potential rewards outweigh the 
consequences.  The rewards to these activists include everything from laws that 
protect the environment to a reduction in population growth.  In regards to expected 
utility, my participants perceive that the benefits of illegal activity outweigh its costs 
when they feel that the cause is worthy enough.  Some interviewees acknowledged 
that they would act criminally if they felt that what they were fighting for was 
important enough and there were no other alternatives.  These decisions were also 
crime-specific as purported by rational choice; most activists claimed that they would 
not engage in violent behavior regardless of the reward. 
An increase in costs, brought forth by legislative efforts on the federal level in 
the form of severe punishments, has significantly decreased the hazard, but increased 
the frequency, of illegal conduct perpetrated by members of radical environmental 
and animal rights groups.  Contrary to the bulk of prior investigations, these findings 
indicate some support for the role of severe punishments.  This unique result could be 




“deterrable” nature of those that engage in terrorism in that they are composed of a 
more “deterrable” demographic.  As LaFree and Ackerman (2009) note, terrorists are 
more likely to be female and college educated than common criminals.  This portrayal 
is consistent with Liddick’s (2006) sample of animal rights activists.  Therefore, 
severe punishments may be ineffective on the general populace, but not among those 
with a higher stake in conformity (Sherman et al., 1992; Maxwell et al., 2002).  It 
could also be that similar to Chamlin and Cochran’s (2000) findings regarding the 
effects of a well-publicized execution on crime rates; that severe punishments have 
crime-specific effects.  Perhaps laws like ADA, AEPA, and AETA only deter more 
rational and instrumental acts, like the majority of those perpetrated by radical eco-
groups.  However, these conclusions can only be made if the time-series results are 
somewhat disregarded (which a case can be made for given the limitations inherent in 
this methodology).  It would seem that these interventions also increased the 
frequency of incidents after their inception, making any policy implications that much 
more complex.   
My findings regarding the Alexander tree-spiking and Kitchen assassination 
are inconsistent with Bouhana and Wikstrom’s (2008) situational action theory in that 
these events did not to change the environment in a way that influenced the frequency 
or hazard of criminal acts committed by members of radical eco-groups.  Given the 
work of Eidelson and McCauley (2009) regarding the post-Oklahoma City bombing 
decline in right-wing support, it is not difficult to imagine that these events could 
have changed the context of certain tactics for members of radical eco-groups in the 




the Orly airport incident did for the decline of prominent terrorist organizations 
(Dugan et al., 2008).  It is possible that the perceived benefits to environmental and 
animal rights extremists outweighed any costs associated with an increase in 
immorality after the Alexander tree-spiking and Kitchen assassination.   
My participants, however, did argue that criminal activity, and particularly 
terrorist activity, delegitimized the movement in the same way that specific terrorist 
events did in the aforementioned research.  There is also no mistaking the importance 
of considering the role of moral inhibitions when examining perceptual deterrence.  
Consistent with what Bachman and colleagues (1992) argue, activists in my sample, 
“refrain(ed) from offending not only because they fear the consequences of their 
action, but because they believe the act to be morally wrong” (p. 346).  Therefore, an 
activist’s internalized level of morality affects their individual cost-benefit analysis of 
a particular act.  Given the philosophical underpinnings of environmental and animal 
rights activists, where all life is equally valued, this finding is not a surprise.  
However, unlike Paternoster and Simpson (1996), I did not find that moral 
evaluations outweighed legal sanctions in most cases; rather, participants voiced 
themes of both legal sanctions and moral inhibitions when describing decisions about 
their behavior and did not rank one above the other.  
Perhaps the policy implications of this study are its most important 
contribution.  For the first time, we have a database of criminal conduct perpetrated 
by radical environmental and animal rights groups.  This database, the EID, is the 
largest to be collected by an independent scholar, using only open and unclassified 




see the primarily nonviolent threat posed by radical eco-groups.  However, the large 
amount of property damage caused by these groups indicates the true nature of the 
threat that they present: an economic one.  Therefore, entities like the FBI need to 
reassess the time and resources spent on combating environmental and animal rights 
extremists.  Certainly members of these groups cannot be the top domestic threat as 
they have been called so many times before, especially given the past and future 
potential for violence that other types of terrorist groups demonstrate.   
This investigation also touched on the role that countermeasures have played 
in the decrease in illegal activity perpetrated by members of radical eco-groups.  As 
noted, prior literature has been less than supportive of the role of both severe 
punishments and countermeasures in deterring crime and terrorism respectively.  
However, this investigation demonstrates that both can be effective at increasing the 
time between incidents, perhaps given the more “deterrable” demographic of 
members of radical eco-groups.  This conclusion, once again, is limited by the 
knowledge that the sanctions in question also increased the frequency of incidents 
(although ascertained from a less robust methodology).    
For the methodological implications, it is important not to gloss over the fact 
that the direction of the findings is conditional on the type of strategy employed.  In 
this dissertation, series hazard modeling produced different results to that of the time-
series analysis.  Time-series analysis is sensitive to both the level of aggregation and 
to the influence that events can have on each other.  As a result, the findings of the 
series hazard analyses often inspire a greater level of confidence.  Nonetheless, these 




results are indicative of what they are measuring rather than the superiority of one 
method over another.  All in all, research should continue to explore the differences 
between time-series and series hazard modeling strategies.  Robust investigations 
should employ both analyses to see if there are conceptual differences in findings 
similar to this investigation.  Furthermore, prior investigations should be revisited to 
see if findings differ under series hazard analysis.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Although I made a concerted effort to control for spurious findings, this study 
is not without its own set of limitations.  First and foremost, and despite a three-year 
data collection effort, the EID is likely flawed.  In having to rely on open sources, I 
was able to only collect the more publicly available incidents.  It is probable that the 
less serious incidents (like the spray-painting of a wall with the letters “ALF” or a 
mink release) did not make a news report or a chronology.  On the other hand, the 
EID may include events that never happened.  This is an issue intrinsic to using group 
communiqués as a source, which certain chronologies did utilize. 
In addition, some of the data were taken from certain organizations that may 
have a bias.  As noted, the Foundation for Biomedical Research, the entity where the 
most incidents were extracted from, had a major role in the passing of the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act.  The fact that I was only able to verify around 30% of my 
cases through an independent news source does give some reason for concern.  Future 
efforts should focus on the additional verification of events.  Furthermore, adding a 
variable to measure the reliability of an incident source would be a useful addition to 




The EID also had more sources in the years after the interventions.  Although 
controlled for in the analyses, this is still a major limitation to the data.  With only 
two total sources of information, only one of which that included terrorist cases, the 
assumed lack of activity in the 1970s could be a measurement error.  However, and as 
previously discussed, the birth dates of major groups starting later in the series 
indicates that activity should not have picked up until late into this decade.   
In regards to the analysis, the time-series analysis was without many control 
variables as there was little data available on anything over time that made theoretical 
sense to include.  This is one of the many benefits to series hazard modeling; the 
ability to control for a greater number of competing explanations, which I was able to 
do in my own analyses.   
 Additional research should also examine additional interventions, especially 
those on a local level.  For instance, countermeasure research has argued that local 
enforcement might be the best avenue of defense against terrorism (Smith et al., 
2009).  It would be interesting to test local measures taken against members of radical 
environmental and animal rights groups.  For instance, has additional security at a 
company like Huntingdon Life Sciences deterred attacks?  Or, how effective have 
area police departments been at catching members of radical eco-groups before an 
attack because of pre-incident behaviors like the purchasing of bomb-making 
equipment (Smith et al., 2009)?   
Future investigations should consider comparative countermeasures, 
especially in the United Kingdom.  This region is where many U.S. groups 




support that legislation or other measures associated with severe sanctions has 
combated criminal conduct perpetrated by members of radical eco-groups, these 
investigations would provide additional support.  Similarly, it would be useful to 
study the role that historical terrorist events have had in regards to the environment of 
the U.K.   
Conclusion 
All in all, this dissertation has the potential to contribute a great amount to 
theory, research, and policy.  For the first time, the rational choice perspective has 
been applied to the criminal conduct of environmental and animal rights extremists 
and in particular, the role of severe sanctions.  This investigation also connected the 
work on moral inhibitions and the moral environment to findings regarding the effects 
of large-scale terrorist events.  The differing results contingent upon the methodology 
employed draws attention to the impact of analysis choice on substantive conclusions.  
Finally, policy implications are inherent to findings that indicate how much an 
economic, but not violent threat, members of these groups pose.   
The answer to whether members of radical environmental and animal rights 
groups are deterred by legal sanctions, morality, both, or neither proved to be a 
complicated one.  This should not be a surprise given the complexity of human 
behavior and the myriad of mechanisms for explaining such behavior.  As a whole, 
members of radical eco-groups appear to have been somewhat influenced by federal 
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Table 3.1, Alternative Chronologies 
Source Years 
Number of U.S. 
Incidents 
Global Terrorism Database 1970-2007 87 
FBR Chronology 1981-2007 474 
Arnold Chronology 1958-1996 215 
Anti-Defamation League 2004-2007 38 
Department of Homeland Security Report 1984-2007 156 
Fur Commission Chronology 1980-2007 271 
Hewitt Chronology 1984-2004 119 
Leader and Probst Chronology 1996-2001 100 
NAIA Chronology 1983-2007 479 
Seattle Times Chronology 1980-2004 46 
Smith Events 1995-2001 19 
Southern Poverty Law Center 1984-2002 97 





























Table 3.2, General Descriptive Statistics for EID, n=1056  






Number Killed .000 .031 0 1 
Number 
Wounded 
.009 .106 0 2 
Damage Amount 830,691.09 3,600,572.73 0 50,000,000 
Weapon Used .186 .118 No Yes 
Terrorism .589 .492 Crime Terrorism 
Person Targeted .185 .388 No Yes 
Damage .692 .462 No Yes 





Table 3.3, Descriptive Statistics for Total Incidents, n=1056 






Days until next attack 14.170 61.908 1 1562 
Interventions     
  Anti-Drug Abuse Act  
  (November 18, 1988) 
.044 .204 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
  (August 26, 1992) 
.014 .118 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
  (November 27, 2006) 
.029 .169 0 1 
Controls     
  Data Source 9.216 2.519 2 12 
  Last Incident 14.471 62.295 1 1562 
  Success Density 80.289 110.054 0 365 
  Monthly Count 344.135 77.748 4 456 





Table 3.4, Descriptive Statistics for Terrorist Incidents, n=622 






Days until next terrorist attack 22.787 77.552 1 1562 
Interventions     
  Anti-Drug Abuse Act  
  (November 18, 1988) 
.047 .211 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
  (August 26, 1992) 
.010 .098 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
  (November 27, 2006) 
.023 .168 0 1 
Controls     
  Data Source 9.370 2.488 2 12 
  Last Incident 23.523 77.888 1 1562 
  Success Density 65.261 106.445 .191 365 
  Monthly Count 338.027 79.795 26 454 
  Animal Rights Ideology .445 .497 0 1 




Table 3.5, Descriptive Statistics for Damage Incidents, n=731 






Days until next damage attack 19.277 72.355 1 1562 
Interventions     
  Anti-Drug Abuse Act  
  (November 18, 1988) 
.045 .208 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
  (August 26, 1992) 
.012 .110 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
  (November 27, 2006) 
.037 .189 0 1 
Controls     
  Data Source 9.047 2.570 2 12 
  Last Incident 20.423 73.381 1 1562 
  Success Density 69.936 105.062 .190 365 
  Monthly Count 347.690 78.169 26 456 






Table 3.6, Descriptive Statistics for Animal-Only Incidents, n=491 






Days until next damage attack 24.867 64.993 1 1091 
Interventions     
  Anti-Drug Abuse Act  
  (November 18, 1988) 
.030 .172 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
  (August 26, 1992) 
.018 .134 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
  (November 27, 2006) 
.039 .193 0 1 
Controls     
  Data Source 9.033 2.602 2 12 
  Last Incident 25.831 67.518 1 1091 
  Success Density 47.107 85.172 0 365 




Table 3.7, Descriptive Statistics for Environmental-Only Incidents, n=288 






Days until next environmental attack 53.638 159.415 1 1916 
Interventions     
  Anti-Drug Abuse Act  
  (November 18, 1988) 
.024 .154 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
  (August 26, 1992) 
.007 .083 0 1 
  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
  (November 27, 2006) 
.007 .083 0 1 
Controls     
  Data Source 9.174 2.507 2 12 
  Last Incident 52.930 158.442 1 1916 
  Success Density 54.349 99.329 0 365 




Table 5.1, Model of Total Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z p 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .020 48.74 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.711 .069 -10.28 .000*** 
 Data_Src  .079 .034 2.32 .020* 
 Intercept .871 .662 1.32 .188 
      
Model 2 ADA -.023 .043 -.54 .59 
 Data_Src .010 .005 1.97 .049* 
 Δ .972 .028 34.35 .000*** 
 Intercept -.008 .034 -.24 .807 
      
Model 3 AEPA .088 .049 1.80 .073 
 Data_Src .012 .006 2.14 .032* 
 Δ .925 .033 27.95 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .034 -.07 .945 
      
Model 4 AETA -.021 .331 -.06 .949 
 Data_Src .010 .006 1.86 .064 
 Δ .962 .019 49.75 .000*** 
 Intercept -.005 .035 -.16 .874 
***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: “Data_Src” is the designation for the control variable measuring number of 
data sources.  “AEPA” (Animal Enterprise Protect Act) ends when “AETA” (Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act) begins because the latter was a revision and extension of 




Table 5.2, Model of Terrorist Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .010 99.67 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.858 .025 -33.78 .000*** 
 Data_Src .053 .031 1.71 .087 
 Intercept .173 .389 0.44 .657 
      
Model 2 ADA -.002 .046 -.05 .956 
 Data_Src .011 .006 1.97 .049* 
 Δ .942 .033 28.95 .000*** 
 Intercept -.005 .046 -.11 .910 
      
Model 3 AEPA .100 .052 1.94 .053 
 Data_Src .012 .006 2.04 .041* 
 Δ .896 .037 24.19 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .048 -.04 .969 
      
Model 4 AETA -.046 .134 -.034 .733 
 Data_Src .011 .006 1.88 .060 
 Δ .942 .024 39.58 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .046 -.08 .940 










Table 5.3, Model of Damage Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .980 .024 40.99 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.692 .071 -9.65 .000*** 
 Data_Src .046 .043 1.08 .282 
 Intercept .842 .691 1.22 .223 
      
Model 2 ADA -.000 .049 -.00 .997 
 Data_Src .010 .006 1.60 .110 
 Δ .951 .035 26.89 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .054 -.04 .966 
      
Model 3 AEPA .124 .058 2.13 .033* 
 Data_Src .011 .007 1.66 .097 
 Δ .899 .041 21.74 .000*** 
 Intercept .005 .058 .08 .936 
      
Model 4 AETA .056 .227 .26 .797 
 Data_Src .011 .007 1.62 .106 
 Δ .948 .027 35.00 .000*** 
 Intercept -.004 .055 -.07 .942 





Table 5.4, Model of Animal-Only Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .023 41.99 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.770 .066 -11.74 .000*** 
 Data_Src .060 .044 1.38 .166 
 Intercept .580 .682 0.85 .395 
      
Model 2 ADA .013 .039 0.33 .739 
 Data_Src .006 .004 1.47 .141 
 Δ .966 .029 33.65 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .037 -0.05 .959 
      
Model 3 AEPA .091 .047 1.94 .052 
 Data_Src .007 .003 2.02 0.044* 
 Δ .927 .033 27.77 .000*** 
 Intercept .000 .027 0.02 .988 
      
Model 4 AETA -.005 1.565 -0.00 .998 
 Data_Src .006 .004 1.61 .107 
 Δ .972 .016 60.26 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .034 -0.09 .930 






Table 5.5, Model of Environment-Only Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .931 .044 21.17 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.645 .080 -8.04 .000*** 
 Data_Src .063 .055 1.14 .256 
 Intercept .161 .570 0.28 .777 
      
Model 2 ADA -.002 .043 -0.04 .965 
 Data_Src .009 .005 1.60 .110 
 Δ .940 .054 17.53 .000*** 
 Intercept -.022 .055 -0.40 .687 
      
Model 3 AEPA .057 .051 1.11 .265 
 Data_Src .008 .006 1.39 .166 
 Δ .907 .062 14.51 .000*** 
 Intercept -.018 .059 -0.31 .759 
      
Model 4 AETA -.221 .407 -0.54 .587 
 Data_Src .007 .005 1.47 .141 
 Δ .949 .035 27.36 .000*** 
 Intercept -.016 .050 -0.32 .747 




Table 5.6, Model of Total Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .988 .009 113.79 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.832 .028 -30.03 .000*** 
 Data_Src .057 .034 1.69 .090 
 Intercept .392 .480 0.82 .413 
      
Model 2 ADA -.002 .013 -0.15 .881 
 Data_Src .003 .001 1.90 .057 
 Δ .984 .010 94.39 .000*** 
 Intercept -.004 .015 -.28 .777 
      
Model 3 AEPA .029 .013 2.26 .024* 
 Data_Src .003 .001 1.97 .049* 
 Δ .966 .012 79.92 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .016 -.21 .830 
      
Model 4 AETA .005 .052 .10 .917 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.91 .056 
 Δ .982 .008 126.49 .000*** 
 Intercept -.004 .015 -0.28 .779 
















Table 5.7, Model of Terrorist Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .010 99.67 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.858 .025 -33.78 .000*** 
 Data_Src .053 .031 1.71 .087 
 Intercept .173 .389 0.44 .657 
      
Model 2 ADA .498 .265 1.88 .061 
 Data_Src .041 .029 1.40 .161 
 Intercept .008 .374 .02 .982 
      
Model 3 AEPA .025 .013 2.02 .043* 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.71 .088 
 Δ .956 .014 67.68 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .016 -.22 .824 
      
Model 4 AETA -.011 .034 -.32 .753 
 Data_Src .003 .001 1.70 .089 
 Δ .975 .009 106.57 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .015 -.21 .837 
***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: ADA’s impact on monthly terrorist incidents was abrupt, permanent rather 





Table 5.8, Model of Damage Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .983 .010 96.29 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.794 .028 -27.89 .000*** 
 Data_Src .027 .035 0.76 .445 
 Intercept .433 .459 0.94 .346 
      
Model 2 ADA .010 .016 .59 .557 
 Data_Src .002 .002 1.28 .200 
 Δ .969 .015 66.18 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .021 -.05 .957 
      
Model 3 AEPA .037 .016 2.28 .022* 
 Data_Src .002 .002 1.32 .188 
 Δ .952 .016 59.37 .000*** 
 Intercept -.000 .022 -.02 .986 
      
Model 4 AETA .018 .054 .33 .739 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.58 .115 
 Δ .976 .010 98.05 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .019 -.14 .885 

















Table 5.9, Model of Animal-Only Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .989 .009 109.81 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.872 .023 -37.26 .000*** 
 Data_Src .025 .032 0.80 .424 
 Intercept .305 .486 0.63 .530 
      
Model 2 ADA .516 .187 2.76 .006** 
 Data_Src .016 .031 0.51 .611 
 Intercept .109 .382 0.29 .775 
      
Model 3 AEPA_2M .076 .421 0.18 .857 
 Data_Src .024 .033 .72 .469 
 Δ -.024 .044 -0.54 .590 
 Intercept .325 .492 0.66 .509 
      
Model 4 AETA .013 .039 .34 .730 
 Data_Src .002 .001 1.29 .198 
 Δ .980 .010 101.13 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .017 -0.14 .892 
***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: ADA’s impact on monthly animal-only incidents was abrupt, permanent 
rather than gradual, permanent.  The slope of AEPA’s impact on monthly animal-only 




Table 5.10, Model of Environment-Only Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .934 .020 45.80 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.679 .044 -15.56 .000*** 
 Data_Src .036 .030 1.22 .224 
 Intercept .023 .294 0.08 .937 
      
Model 2 ADA .028 .022 1.28 .200 
 Data_Src .002 .003 .80 .424 
 Δ .896 .029 30.78 .000*** 
 Intercept -.000 .031 -0.02 .986 
      
Model 3 AEPA .041 .021 1.96 .050* 
 Data_Src .003 .003 0.91 .364 
 Δ .883 .031 28.11 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .031 -.03 .977 
      
Model 4 AETA -.020 .073 -0.28 .781 
 Data_Src .003 .003 1.29 .196 
 Δ .925 .022 41.48 .000*** 
 Intercept -.002 .027 -0.06 .953 










































































Context      








































***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: “Success_Dens” is success density, “AR_Ideology” is animal rights’ 






















Table 6.1, Model of All Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .020 48.74 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.711 .069 -10.28 .000*** 
 Data_Src  .079 .034 2.32 .020* 
 Intercept .871 .662 1.32 .188 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike -.003 .046 -0.06 .954 
 Data_Src .010 .005 1.91 .057 
 Δ .962 .030 32.11 .000*** 
 Intercept -.006 .037 -0.18 .861 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .013 .046 0.28 .781 
 Data_Src .011 .006 1.84 .065 
 δ .955 .032 29.97 .000*** 
 Intercept -.005 .037 -0.14 .886 
***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: “Data_Src” is the designation for the control variable measuring number of 
data sources.  “Tree-spike” represents the incident involving the Alexander tree-















Table 6.2, Model of All Terrorist Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .970 .025 39.36 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.713 .069 -10.34 .000*** 
 Data_Src .086 .041 2.10 .036 
 Intercept .491 .546 0.90 .369 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .036 .055 0.65 .513 
 Data_Src .011 .006 1.77 .077 
 Δ .922 .037 25.08 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .050 -0.02 .988 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .017 .046 0.36 .716 
 Data_Src .011 .006 1.93 .054 
 Δ .932 .034 27.58 .000*** 
 Intercept -.004 .048 -0.09 .932 





Table 6.3, Model of All Damage Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .980 .024 40.99 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.692 .071 -9.65 .000*** 
 Data_Src .046 .043 1.08 .282 
 Intercept .842 .691 1.22 .223 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .067 .065 21.31 .000*** 
 Data_Src .009 .007 1.27 .204 
 δ .918 .043 21.31 .000*** 
 Intercept .008 .063 0.12 .902 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .053 .051 1.04 .297 
 Data_Src .010 .007 1.47 .141 
 δ .925 .039 24.01 .000*** 
 Intercept .002 .061 0.04 .970 



















Table 6.4, Model of Animal-Only Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .023 41.99 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.770 .066 -11.74 .000*** 
 Data_Src .060 .044 1.38 .166 
 Intercept .580 .682 0.85 .395 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike -.001 .038 -0.04 .972 
 Data_Src .006 .004 1.50 .133 
 δ .972 .027 35.91 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .037 -0.09 .929 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .041 .039 1.04 .296 
 Data_Src .005 .004 1.47 .142 
 δ .952 .031 31.09 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .037 -0.02 .987 








Table 6.5, Model of Environment-Only Incidents by Quarter 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .931 .044 21.17 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.645 .080 -8.04 .000*** 
 Data_Src .063 .055 1.14 .256 
 Intercept .161 .570 0.28 .777 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike -.023 .046 -0.50 .616 
 Data_Src .010 .005 1.78 .076 
 δ .952 .051 18.59 .000*** 
 Intercept     
      
Model 3 Kitchen .005 .042 0.11 .910 
 Data_Src .009 .005 1.56 .119 
 δ .936 .054 17.36 .000*** 
 Intercept -.022 .056 -0.39 .698 























Table 6.6, Model of Total Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .988 .009 113.79 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.832 .028 -30.03 .000*** 
 Data_Src .057 .034 1.69 .090 
 Intercept .392 .480 0.82 .413 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .009 .016 0.58 .560 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.54 .123 
 δ .977 .012 80.35 .000 
 Intercept -.003 .016 -0.19 .852 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .009 .013 0.69 .490 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.78 .070 
 δ .977 .011 87.11 .000 
 Intercept -.004 .016 -0.23 .817 

















Table 6.7, Model of All Terrorist Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .984 .010 99.67 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.858 .025 -33.78 .000*** 
 Data_Src .053 .031 1.71 .087 
 Intercept .173 .389 0.44 .657 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .009 .015 0.61 .543 
 Data_Src .002 .002 1.47 .140 
 δ .967 .013 71.77 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .016 -0.18 .856 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .006 .012 0.49 .623 
 Data_Src .003 .002 1.70 .090 
 δ .970 .012 78.22 .000*** 
 Intercept -.003 .015 -0.23 .820 

































Table 6.8, Model of All Damage Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .983 .010 96.29 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.794 .028 -27.89 .000*** 
 Data_Src .027 .035 0.76 .445 
 Intercept .433 .459 0.94 .346 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .025 .021 1.20 .231 
 Data_Src .002 .002 0.87 .387 
 δ .958 .017 55.33 .000*** 
 Intercept .001 .023 0.05 .961 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .020 .015 1.29 .196 
 Data_Src .002 .002 1.21 .225 
 δ .962 .015 66.09 .000 
 Intercept -.001 .022 -0.04 .968 































Table 6.9, Model of Animal-Only Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .989 .009 109.81 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.872 .023 -37.26 .000*** 
 Data_Src .025 .032 0.80 .424 
 Intercept .305 .486 0.63 .530 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .013 .014 0.93 .353 
 Data_Src .001 .002 0.76 .448 
 δ .970 .015 66.60 .000*** 
 Intercept -.000 .019 -0.02 .985 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .022 .012 1.80 .072 
 Data_Src .001 .002 0.89 .371 
 δ .962 .015 62.35 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .019 -0.04 .967 






























Table 6.10, Model of Environment-Only Incidents by Month 
 Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z P 
Model 1 AR (1) .934 .020 45.80 .000*** 
 MA(1) -.679 .044 -15.56 .000*** 
 Data_Src .036 .030 1.22 .224 
 Intercept .023 .294 0.08 .937 
      
Model 2 Tree_Spike .025 .025 1.02 .309 
 Data_Src .002 .003 0.73 .467 
 δ .901 .029 31.45 .000*** 
 Intercept .000 .030 0.00 1.000 
      
Model 3 Kitchen .027 .020 1.31 .190 
 Data_Src .003 .003 0.91 .365 
 δ .897 .029 31.41 .000*** 
 Intercept -.001 .031 -0.05 .964 
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***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: “Success_Dens” is success density, “AR_Ideology” is animal rights’ 





























































































































Context      














































***significant at p<.001 **significant at p<.01 *significant at p<.05 
NOTE: “Success_Dens” is success density, “AR_Ideology” is animal rights’ 






Appendix 1.1, Institutional Review Board Approved Consent Form 
 
Page 1 of 4 
                  Initials _______ Date ______ 
          CONSENT FORM      
Project Title The Etiology of Activism 
Why is this 
research being 
done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Jennifer 
Varriale at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you 
are an animal rights or environmental activist.  The purpose of 
this research project is to understand the background of the 
environmental and animal rights movements and to ascertain 
the motivations for activism.   
What will I be 




The procedures involve a one hour interview in the small 
conference room in Symons Hall.  The following pre-selected 
questions will be asked: 
1. How did you get involved into the movement? 
2. What kinds of activities do you participate in? 
3. Do you ascribe to any particular environmental 
philosophy?  Deep ecology?  Biocentrism?   
4. Do you believe that the damage that has been done to 
the environment is irreversible? 
5. Do you think that lobbying is an effective strategy for 
solving problems?  What about civil disobedience or 
nonviolent criminal acts? 
6. Are you familiar with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 that criminalized tree-spiking?  Has this 
influenced your behavior in any way? 
7. What about the PATRIOT act and the redefinition of 
terrorism?  Or the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 
1992 and more recent Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
of 2006? 
8. Did the Oklahoma City bombing and/or September 11th 
change your views on terrorism and/or the use of 
criminal activity as a tactic? 
9. Is harming a human ever justified?  Threatening harm? 
10. Do you feel that with the release of Al Gore’s 
documentary and the emergence of a more mainstream 
green movement that there is more hope today than 
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We will do our best to keep your personal information 
confidential.  To help protect your confidentiality, this 
research would identify you only through an ID number.  Your 
name will not be included on the interview audiotape and  
transcript, a code will be placed on the interview audiotape 
and  transcript, through the use of an identification key, the 
researcher will be able to link your audiotape and  transcript  
to your identity, and only the researcher will have access to 
the identification key.   The audiotapes will be destroyed once 
the transcripts are typed up (within 48 hours).  All materials 
will be kept in locked cabinets and on password-protected 
computers.  If we write a report or article about this research 
project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent 
possible.  Your information may be shared with 
representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park 
or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in 
danger or if we are required to do so by law. 
 
___   I agree to be audiotaped during my participation in this 
study. 
___   I do not agree to be audiotaped during my participation 
in this study. 
 
In accordance with legal requirements and/or professional 
standards, we will disclose to the appropriate individuals 
and/or authorities information that comes to our attention 
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What are the 
risks of this 
research? 
 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this 
research project.  
What are the 
benefits of this 
research?  
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the 
results may help the investigator learn more about the animal 
rights and environmental movements. We hope that, in the 
future, other people might benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of activism. 
Do I have to be in 
this research? 
May I stop 
participating at 
any time?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  
You may choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to 
participate in this research, you may stop participating at any 
time.  If you decide not to participate in this study or if you 
stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or 
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This research is being conducted by Dr. Gary LaFree at the 
University of Maryland, College Park.  If you have any 
questions about the research study itself, please contact Dr. 
Gary LaFree  at: 3300 Symons Hall, 301-405-6600, 
glafree@crim.umd.edu. 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject 
or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, 
College Park, Maryland, 20742;  (e-mail) 
irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the University 
of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research 
involving human subjects. 
Statement of Age 
of Subject and 
Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that: 
   you are at least 18 years of age;,  
   the research has been explained to you; 
   your questions have been fully answered; and  
  you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this 
research   
 project. 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
 
 




















Appendix 1.2, EID Codebook 
 
1. ID: Create an identifying number for the incident based on the date (i.e. 
March 15, 2005 would be 31505). 







9. PERPETRATOR: Fill out if one is listed.  List “Unknown” if there is no 
group. 
10.   IDEOLOGY 
a. Unknown=0 
b. Animal rights=1 
c. Environment=2 
d. Multiple ideologies (often more than one group)=3 
11.   ATTACK TYPE: Values and definitions below. 
 
Assassination=1 An act whose primary objective is to kill 
one or more specific, prominent 
individuals.  
Armed Assault=2 An attack whose primary objective is to 
cause physical harm or death directly to 
human beings by any means other than 
an explosive.  
Bombing/Explosion=3 An attack where the primary effects are 
caused by an energetically unstable 
material undergoing rapid 
decomposition (either deflagration or 
detonation) and releasing a pressure 
wave that causes physical damage to the 
surrounding environment. 
Hijacking=4 An act whose primary objective is to 
take control of a vehicle such as an 
aircraft, boat, bus, etc. for the purpose of 
diverting it to an unprogrammed 
destination, obtain payment of a ransom, 
force the release of prisoners, or some 
other political objective. 
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)=5 An act whose primary objective is to 
obtain political or other concessions in 
return for the release of prisoners 
(hostages). 




distinguished by the intention to move 
and hold the hostages in a clandestine 
location. 
Facility/Infrastructure Attack=7 An act, excluding the use of an 
explosive, whose primary objective is to 
cause damage to a non-human target, 
such as a building, monument, train, 
pipeline, etc.  Such attacks consist of 
actions primarily aimed at damaging 
property, or at causing a diminution in 
the functioning of a useful system (mass 
disruption) yet not causing direct harm 
to people.  Such attacks include arson, 
cyber attacks, and various forms of 
sabotage. 
Unarmed Assault=8 An attack whose primary objective is to 
cause physical harm or death directly to 
human beings by any means other than 
explosive, firearm, incendiary, or sharp 
instrument (knife, etc.). 
Unknown=9 The attack type cannot be determined 
from the available information. 
 
    12.  TARGET TYPE: Values and definitions below. 
    
Business=1 Businesses are defined as individuals or organizations 
engaged in commercial or mercantile activity as a means of 
livelihood.   
Government=2 Any attack on a government building; government member, 
former members, including members of political parties, their 
convoys, or events sponsored by political parties; political 
movements; or a government sponsored institution where the 
attack is expressly carried out to harm the government.  
Police=3 This value includes attacks on members of the police force or 
police installations; this includes police boxes, patrols 
headquarters, academies, cars, checkpoints, etc.  
Military=4 Includes attacks against army units, patrols, barracks, and 
convoys, jeeps, etc.  Also includes attacks on recruiting sites, 
and soldiers engaged in internal policing functions such as at 
checkpoints and in anti-narcotics activities. 
Abortion-Related=5 Attacks on abortion clinics, employees, patrons, or security 
personnel stationed at clinics.   
Airport/Airlines=6 An attack that was carried out either against an airplane or 
against an airport.  Attacks against airline employees while on 
board are also included in this value.  




(Diplomatic)=7 embassies, consulates, etc.  
Educational 
Institution=8 
Attacks against schools, teachers, or guards protecting school 
sites.  Includes attacks against university professors, teaching 
staff and school buses.  Moreover, includes attacks against 
religious schools in this value.   
Food or  
Water Supply=9 
Attacks on food or water supplies or reserves are included in 
this value.  
Journalists/Media=10 Includes, attacks on reporters, news assistants, photographers, 
publishers, as well as attacks on media headquarters and 
offices. 
Maritime=11 Implies civilian maritime. Includes attacks against fishing 
ships, oil tankers, ferries, yachts, etc. 
NGO=12 Includes attacks on offices and employees of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  NGOs here are defined 
as primarily large multinational non-governmental 
organizations. These include the Red Cross and Doctors 
without Borders. Peacekeepers also belong to this value. 
Other=13 This value includes acts of terrorism committed against 
targets which do not fit into other categories.   
Private 
Citizens/Party=14 
This value includes attacks on individuals, the public in 
general or attacks in public areas including markets, 
commercial streets, busy intersections and pedestrian malls. 
Religious 
Figures/Institutions=15 
This value includes attacks on religious leaders, (Imams, 
priests, bishops, etc.), religious institutions (mosques, 
churches), religious places or objects (shrines, relics, etc.).   
Telecommunication=16 This includes attacks on facilities and infrastructure for the 
transmission of information.  More specifically this value 
includes things like cell phone towers, telephone booths, 
television transmitters, radio, and microwave towers.   
Terrorists=17 Terrorists or members of identified terrorist groups are 
included in this value.  Membership is broadly defined and 
includes informants for terrorist groups, but excludes former 
terrorists.  
Tourists=18 This value includes the targeting of tour buses, tourists, or 
“tours.”  Tourists are persons who travel primarily for the 
purposes of leisure or amusement. 
Transportation=19 Attacks on public transportation systems are included in this 
value.  
Unknown=20 The target type cannot be determined from the available 
information. 
Utilities=21 This value pertains to facilities for the transmission or 
generation of energy.   
Violent Political 
Parties=22 
This value pertains to entities that are both political parties 
(and thus, coded as “government” in this coding scheme) and 
terrorists.  It is operationally defined as groups that engage in 





13.  SUCCESS: 0 or 1 (0=Incident did not have intended effects, 1=Incident had 
intended effects).  For example, “a bomb goes off” is a successful attack.  That 
same bomb not going off is unsuccessful. 
14.  NKILL: Number killed if any (most of the time this will be zero) 
15.  NWOUND: Number wounded if any (most of the time this will be zero) 
16.  WEAPON: 0 or 1 (0=Weapon was not used during incident, 1=Weapon was 
used during incident).  In the GTD, weapon classifications include 
biological/chemical radiological/nuclear (CBRN), firearms, 
explosives/bombs/dynamite, fake weapons, incendiary, melee, vehicle (not 
vehicle-born explosives), sabotage equipment, other, and unknown.   
17. WEAP_TYP: Values below. 
1 = Biological  
2 = Chemical  
3 = Radiological  
4 = Nuclear  
5 = Firearms  
6 = Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite  
7 = Fake Weapons  
8 = Incendiary  
9 = Melee  
10 = Vehicle (not to include vehicle-borne explosives, i.e., car or truck bombs)  
11 = Sabotage Equipment  
12 = Other  
13 = Unknown 
18.  DAMAGE: 0 or 1 (0=There wasn’t damage, 1=There was damage) 
19.  DAM_AMT: Numeric representation of damage if there is a damage amount 
(i.e. $10,000) 
20.  TERRORISM: 0 or 1 (0=Not terrorism, 1=Terrorism) 
In short, the incident has to have the following three elements: 
1) Non-state actor 
2) Deliberate act 
3) Violence or the threat of violence 
Moreover, the incident has to have two of following three elements (in any 
combination as long as two are met): 
1) A social, political, economic or religious goal (with regard to economic it 
cannot be the pure pursuit of money) 
The violent act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal. This criterion is not satisfied in those cases where the 
perpetrator(s) acted out of a pure profit motive or from an idiosyncratic 
personal motive unconnected with broader societal change. 
2) An intent to coerce or intimidate to a larger audience than the immediate 
victim(s) 
To satisfy this criterion there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) 




the following: pre- or post-attack statements by the perpetrator(s), past 
behavior by the perpetrators, or the particular nature of the target, weapon, or 
attack type 
       3) Outside international humanitarian law 
The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the 
act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian 
law (jus in bello) as reflected in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and elsewhere. 
21.  TARTGET_PEOPLE: 0 or 1 (0=Incident did not target a person, 1=The 
Incident did target a person) 
22.   SUMMARY: Short description of incident (can be taken directly from 
source) 
23.   SOURCE: List of primary source from where incident came from (this can 
be a chronology) 
24:  SOURCE VERIFIED: Mark “yes” if you have directly seen the primary 
source 
25:  ADDITONAL SOURCE: If the case is terrorism, you must find an 
additional news source in Lexus Nexus or FACTIVA and list the link in the 
column. 
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